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Abstract 
 This thesis aims to explore and critique the current law governing the refusal of 
medical treatment by mature minors. Through assessment of the application and 
interpretation of the current law, the legal picture is found to be unsatisfactory. The 
law in this area is riddled with confusion. This thesis aims not only to call for reform 
within this area, but to question the validity of the infamous Re R and Re W cases. This 
thesis will explore refusal cases involving mature minors, criticising the judiciary’s 
apparent avoidance of the difficult issues within this area. It shall be argued that the 
courts have avoided embracing mature minors’ autonomy by manipulating, or even 
ignoring, the Gillick test when deciding whether a child deserves capacity. As such, 
the law is in need of urgent clarification.  
 This thesis shall argue that the law in this area, currently appearing to prevent 
competent minors being granted capacity, is incompatible with the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. Finally, this thesis concludes by stating that most suitable 
route for reform would be through the judiciary, whilst emphasising the importance of 
society’s willingness to embrace children’s independence, abilities, and rights as a 
crucial aspect of reform.  Ultimately, this thesis aims to argue that competence should, 
as a general rule, lead to determinative capacity for mature minors. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 Despite the fact that medical law now places greater emphasis on patient autonomy 
over excessive paternalism as its central concept,1 there is yet to be a case heard by 
the judiciary in which a mature, competent minor has been allowed to refuse medical 
treatment. Following from this fact, this thesis aims to find out why the judiciary 
appear so reluctant to grant autonomy to competent, mature minors. It aims to 
demonstrate that the courts are clutching to their paternalistic control of minors, 
despite human rights obligations and children’s rights progress appearing to require 
an increased respect for autonomous and competently made decisions. Despite 
evidence of understanding and intelligence on behalf of the children involved, the 
judiciary have employed a plethora of dubious tactics to prevent the minor exercising 
autonomy.2 This reluctance is most starkly apparent where the result of allowing that 
child control over their medical treatment would be the child’s death or serious injury. 
As such, this thesis shall focus on the refusal of life-saving or life-prolonging 
treatment. 
 The famous and largely celebrated Gillick case created an unprecedented test for the 
competence of minors below the age of 16.3 Previously, only the rights of children 
aged 16-17 to consent to treatment had been directly addressed in legislation.4 Hence, 
the Gillick judges had to consider whether those under 16s had the potential to make 
their own decisions regarding treatment without parental consideration. 5  Lord 
                                                 
1 For example, see R (on the Application of Burke) v GMC [2005] 3 FCR 169, [30] (Lord Phillips 
MR); St George’s Heathcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 WLR 936, 950 (Judge LJ); Andrew Grubb, 
‘Refusal of Treatment (Child): Competence’ (1999) 7(1) Medical Law Review 58, 59; JJ Chin, 
‘Doctor-patient Relationship: from Medical Paternalism to Enhanced Autonomy’ (2002) 43(3) 
Singapore Medical Journal 152, 152.  
2 Jane Fortin ‘The Gillick Decision- Not Just a High-Water Mark’ in Stephen Gilmore, Jonathan 
Herring and Rebecca Probert (eds), Landmark Cases in Family Law (Hart Publications 2011) 121.  
3 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112.  
4 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s8.  
5 Gillick (n 3) 182 (Lord Scarman).  
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Scarman concluded that such children cannot be seen to be entirely reliant on parental 
involvement until the Family Law Reform Act (hereinafter FLRA) applies, and 
proceeds to create the famous Gillick competence test. 6  In sum, the Gillick case 
provided that children would have the competence to decide whether or not they had 
medical treatment if they could demonstrate ‘sufficient intelligence and 
understanding’ of that procedure.7 Nevertheless, the liberal nature of this test, granting 
a greater degree of autonomy to competent minors, was short-lived. In the early 1990s, 
Lord Donaldson sought to restrict the rights Gillick competence would grant to mature 
minors.8 Although the details of these cases will be discussed further within Chapter 
II, ultimately Lord Donaldson’s judgments meant that even if undeniably competent, 
a minor may still be overridden in their refusal of medical treatment where the 
outcome would be life-threatening or could lead to serious injury.9 Despite this green 
light to override even competent minors, the judiciary have subsequently tended to 
avoid the direct application of his judgments. Instead, they have tended to find the 
minors involved to be lacking in competence through dubious manipulation of the 
Gillick test or even failure to apply it entirely. These cases shall be the focus of this 
thesis.  
 This thesis aims to highlight and condemn the current judicial approach regarding 
mature minors’ refusals of medical treatment and cut through the fog which surrounds 
the current law. Due to the avoidant tactics of the judiciary, minors are left in the dark 
regarding their rights. It is unclear whether a minor could ever be competent enough 
to be granted full capacity over their medical decisions where the outcome would be 
                                                 
6 ibid 182-189.  
7 ibid 188-9.  
8 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11; Re W (A Minor) (Medical 
Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64.  
9 ibid 81-2 (Lord Donaldson).  
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death or serious injury. Ultimately, this thesis aims to prove that the law in this area is 
primarily in need of clarification. Secondly, it shall aim to support the conclusion that 
this clarification should come in the form of accepting competent minors’ decisions 
where they are made with sufficient understanding and autonomy, even if the 
consequences are hard to accept.  
Definitions 
 Academics within this area have taken many different definitions of the key terms 
‘competence’ and ‘capacity’.10 In order to ensure clarity throughout, this thesis shall 
firstly set out its own definitions of these terms. For the purposes of this thesis, 
‘competence’ shall be used to describe the satisfaction of the legal tests within Gillick 
for under 16s, and the Mental Capacity Act (hereinafter MCA) test for 16-17 year olds 
and adults above the age of majority. Within Chapter V, the concept of competence 
also requiring an element of autonomy which may go beyond these formal legal tests 
shall also be explored.11 Overall, ‘competence’ is intended to describe mental abilities 
to understand relevant information and properly exercise decision-making abilities. 
On the other hand, the term ‘capacity’ shall be used to signify the acceptance of the 
individual’s choice as determinative at law. As such, a child could be seen to have 
high levels of maturity and intelligence in the Gillick sense, meaning that they have 
the mental abilities to decide for themselves, but if the judiciary choose to intervene 
with that decision and deny them determinative choice, this child would have 
competence, yet lack capacity.  
                                                 
10 For example, see use of the terms within: Emma Cave, ‘Maximisation of Minors’ Capacity’ (2011) 
23(4) Child and Family Law Quarterly 431, 433 and Shaun D Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics 
(Fourth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2014) 136.  
11 This shall refer to the development of the inherent jurisdiction. See discussion within: Jonathan 
Herring, Vulnerable Adults and the Law (Oxford University Press 2016) 54.  
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 Finally, it shall serve as useful to predetermine terms used to refer to particular sets 
of cases throughout this thesis. The phrase ‘retreat cases’ shall be used to refer to the 
Re R and Re W cases. These cases shall be explored further within the subsequent 
chapter, and this term was chosen due to their reputation as the cases which encompass 
the infamous ‘retreat from Gillick’.12 Additionally, the term ‘refusal cases’ shall be 
used to refer to the judicial cases involving a mature minor refusing life-saving or life-
prolonging treatment following the controversial dicta within the retreat cases.  
 Finally, the term ‘minors’ should be taken to encompass all individuals under the age 
of majority, unless the term ‘young adult(s)’ is used, in which case this refers 
exclusively to those of 16 and 17 who attract the principles within section 8 of the 
FLRA. Adults shall, of course, refer to those over the age of majority.  
Chapter Breakdown  
 In order to demonstrate this thesis’ intended conclusion, four substantial chapters 
shall address the main areas of interest. Issues which shall be explored involve the 
validity of the retreat cases, the judicial reasoning employed within the refusal cases 
and the relevant human rights obligations and concurrent progress within the law more 
generally regarding autonomy and paternalism. All of this shall lead to a discussion of 
the potential reform options for this area of law, suggesting that the judiciary should 
aim to resolve their own mistakes.  
 Firstly, Chapter II shall act as an introduction to the key case law within this area. The 
pivotal Gillick case and its relevant test for competence for under 16s shall be 
discussed, and its impact on issues such as parental rights and capacity explored. Next, 
this chapter shall explore the Re R and Re W cases, which placed a limit on minors’ 
                                                 
12 Rachel Taylor, ‘Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R(Axon) v Secretary of State for Health’ [2007] 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 81, 94. 
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chances of being granted decision-making capacity even where they can demonstrate 
a high level of competence.13 It shall aim to cast doubt on the validity of the reasoning 
within the retreat cases, drawing on their inherent incompatibility with Gillick as well 
as general flaws within the judgments of Lord Donaldson. It shall be evidenced that 
Lord Donaldson’s reasoning in limiting the power of Gillick competence is ultimately 
unconvincing. Overall, the aim of this chapter is to set the scene for the controversy 
which followed the retreat cases, providing a potential explanation for judicial 
reluctance to apply their principles in a direct manner.  
 Next, Chapter III shall explore the refusal cases. Following the retreat cases, a torrent 
of criticism poured over Lord Donaldson’s judgment due to its overtly and 
overwhelmingly paternalistic outlook.14 This thesis aims to show that this controversy 
led to judicial reluctance to apply the judgments within subsequent cases where a 
mature minor refused with potential competence. Rather than embracing fully the idea 
that a competent child can be denied capacity, this chapter aims to show that the 
judiciary have instead chosen to manipulate and even ignore the Gillick test in order 
to conveniently find the child involved lacking in competence. This allows for a less 
controversial override of the minor’s wishes, making the judiciary’s job a little easier 
when it comes to exercising paternalism. This chapter aims to condemn these judicial 
tactics, utilising case law examples to demonstrate the injustice done to mature minors 
through dubious findings of incompetence. The overall aim of this chapter is to expose 
                                                 
13 Re R and Re W (n 8).  
14 For example, see: Alexander McCall Smith, ‘Consent to Treatment in Childhood’ (1992) 67(10) 
Archives of Disease in Childhood 1247, 1248; Ian Kennedy, ‘Consent to Treatment: The Capable 
Person’ in Clare Dyer (ed), Doctors, Patients and the Law (Blackwell Scientific Publications 1992) 
58-9; Graeme Austin, ‘Righting a Child’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment: Section 11 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Gillick Competent Child’ (1992) 7(4) Otago Law Review 578, 578 
and 583.  
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the confusion currently evident within this area of law, largely as a result of the 
judiciary’s avoidance of the hard-hitting issues.  
 Chapter IV shall follow this conclusion and suggest what the focus of the law should 
be regarding any subsequent reform. It shall explore the huge changes which have 
occurred within the law in the two decades since the retreat case were concluded. In 
particular, the focus of this chapter shall be on the progress made with regards to 
autonomy and human rights as a result of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (hereinafter UNCRC or CRC), the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereinafter HRA) 
and judicial progress made within medical law more generally in replacing 
paternalism with patient autonomy as its central concept. As a result of the increased 
prominence of autonomy rights, this chapter aims to counteract claims that the 
confusion within this area of law should be remedied by revoking all rights of minors 
to refuse until they reach the age of majority. It shall be demonstrated that such a 
conclusion, although undoubtedly bringing about clarity for minors’ rights, would be 
incompatible with human rights obligations. As such, any reform ought to embrace 
the competence of minors and allow such abilities to lead to real control over their 
decisions.  
 Chapter V shall consequently explore the routes through which reform could be 
achieved within this area. The potential for judicial change through common law 
principles and the HRA shall be explored as a potential route for positive change, as 
well as exploring the possibility of legislative change in the form of extending the 
MCA to under 16s. In addition, the all-important likelihood of such changes being 
made shall also be critically assessed. The conclusion shall be that there is currently a 
restrictive reluctance to embrace the abilities of even mature, competent minors to 
have meaningful control over their own medical decisions, especially where the 
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consequences of such autonomy would be death or serious harm for the child. The 
most poignant obstacle, it shall be suggested, is a social barrier to change. There 
remains reluctance to let go of the dichotomy between childhood and adulthood which 
reinforces harmful and inaccurate stereotypes regarding children as inherently weak, 
illogical, and vulnerable beings.15 As such, this final chapter shall suggest that the law 
cannot realistically expect true, all-encompassing change for minors until smaller 
steps towards addressing these stereotypes are taken. It shall be concluded that the 
most suitable branch to tackle such a task is the judiciary, due to the common law’s 
piecemeal approach to reform. Ways in which the barriers to embracing minors’ 
autonomy rights can be broken incrementally shall be suggested, with the implication 
that any broad reform in the future would be more easily accepted if the stance 
regarding minors’ rights to refuse life-saving treatment was done with a steady pace. 
The end goal would be the overrule of the antiquated retreat cases, and the acceptance 
that minors acting with full competence and autonomy deserve to be granted decision 
making capacity without interference. 
 Overall, this thesis aims to expose the judiciary’s avoidance of the challenge which 
comes with allowing competent minors meaningful capacity and autonomy. Although 
it is difficult to accept that a child can choose to refuse life-changing treatment, if that 
decision is made with competence and understanding of the consequences, that child 
has earned the right to be the arbiter of their own fate. Adults may disagree with the 
decisions of mature, competent minors, but the decisions are ultimately their own to 
make.16 Competence ought to lead to the recognition of real rights for minors, and the 
                                                 
15 Priscilla Alderson, ‘Competent Children? Minors’ Consent to Health Care Treatment and Research’ 
(2007) 65 Social Science and Medicine 2272, 2276.  
16 Sheila AM McLean, ‘Whose Decision is it Anyway?’ The BMJ.com (14 November 2008)   
<http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2008/11/14/sheila-mclean-whose-decision-is-it-anyway/> accessed 21 
June 2017.  
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possibility of minors being mature enough to attain this lucrative status must be 
embraced. To deny competence and subsequent capacity to an intelligent, autonomous 
child in order to avoid confronting the difficult moral questions raised by the retreat 
cases is demeaning and unnecessary. Once competent, that child should be trusted to 
make their decision having considered all the available information and their own 
personal beliefs and convictions. To intervene with such decisions is to exercise 
unnecessary and excessive paternalism. Such interventions should be limited to 
children who are truly in need of judicial protection.  This thesis calls for the judiciary 
to step up to the challenge of reforming the law, and to embrace capacity for competent 
minors despite the difficult moral issues involved.  
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Chapter II: Minors’ Capacity and the Law 
 This chapter will seek to explore the current law which governs the highly-contested 
area of children’s capacity. It is a subject riddled with controversy and confusion, 
making this task no simple endeavour. Primarily, the all-important Gillick case shall 
be discussed.1 The meaning of this ground-breaking authority shall be examined in the 
context of academic discussion, and its main issues of contention addressed. This 
chapter will attempt to conclude what exactly was meant by ‘understanding’ and the 
consequences of a minor’s attainment of Gillick competence for parental rights as well 
as exploring the law relating to 16 and 17 year olds under the FLRA. Following this, 
the so-called ‘retreat from Gillick’2  shall be critically discussed. It shall be argued that 
these cases are questionable authorities in terms of their status as precedent as well as 
their compatibility with the judicially superior Gillick case.  
 Ultimately, it shall be concluded that the law in this area is far from clear cut. It shall 
set the stage for further critique of the application of these already questionable case 
authorities by the judiciary, which shall be the focus of the subsequent chapter.  
The Gillick Case 
 The Gillick case has attained fame in the legal community; it altered the status of 
children in English law cataclysmically.3 The case began somewhat mundanely, with 
written correspondence between a devoutly religious mother and her doctor’s surgery. 
The eponymous Mrs Gillick sought assurance that none of her daughters could obtain 
contraceptive advice from their doctor in the future without her consent whilst they 
                                                 
1 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112.  
2 Rachel Taylor, ‘Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R(Axon) v Secretary of State for Health’ [2007] 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 81, 94.  
3 Jane Fortin, ‘The Gillick Decision– Not Just a High-Water Mark’ in Stephen Gilmore, Jonathan 
Herring and Rebecca Probert (eds) Landmark Cases in Family Law (Hart Publications 2011) 212.  
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were under 16 years of age. She took the issue to court, hoping to obtain judicial 
confirmation that children had no right to autonomy in terms of consent to medical 
treatment until they reached 16.4 Whilst Mrs Gillick was unsuccessful in her legal 
endeavours, this House of Lords case nevertheless had a profound impact in medical 
consent law and beyond. It gave an unprecedented legal test for the competence of 
under 16s, allowing them to consent to treatment without parental involvement.5 This 
test, mentioned in both Lord Fraser and Lord Scarman’s judgments, states that the 
minor must demonstrate ‘sufficient intelligence and understanding’ of the procedure 
proposed in order to demonstrate their competence to decide.6 The fine details of the 
case are hotly contested, and although impossible to address every controversy in 
detail, this chapter shall begin by attempting to clarify the main issues relating to 
children’s rights to control their own medical treatment.   
Gillick, parental rights and refusal rights  
 One issue addressed within Gillick was the status of parental rights regarding children 
with competence. Although contested as a result of later cases,7 Lord Scarman states 
that parental rights to decide whether their child will have medical treatment will 
‘terminate’ upon the child’s attainment of Gillick competence.8 Although this appears 
a clear-cut answer regarding the endurance of parental rights over their competent 
child, this issue requires further exploration.  
 Some feel that the issue was unclearly settled within Gillick. This is because Lord 
Scarman and his fellow judges make some confusing and at times contradictory 
                                                 
4 At which age a minor would obtain protection through section 8 FLRA.  
5 Anthony Perera, 'Can I Decide Please? The State of Children's Consent in the UK' (2008) 15 
European Journal of Health Law 411, 413.  
6 Gillick (n 1) 114.  
7 See discussion of Re R and Re W from page 8 onwards.  
8 Gillick (n 1) 188-9 (Lord Scarman).  
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statements about parental rights. Whilst stating that parental rights to determine 
medical treatment for the child ‘terminate’ once the child is competent, Lord Scarman 
also admits that parental rights ‘do not wholly disappear until the age of majority’.9 
Some, such as Stephen Gilmore, see this as evidence that the Gillick judgment was not 
as liberal as it has been interpreted as in subsequent years.10 He feels that it is difficult 
to say that parents have no rights upon the child’s attainment of competence, and that 
due to the above contradiction he cannot accept that Gillick competence was intended 
to lead to absolute autonomy for the child.11  
 Nevertheless, with respect, this interpretation can be questioned. Although Lord 
Scarman stated that parental rights can endure until majority, this is an incredibly 
broad statement. Parental responsibility encompasses a wide range of issues, including 
where the child resides, where they go to school, what religious practices they 
experience and so on.  As such, it is suggested that although appearing contradictory, 
Lord Scarman’s comments about the termination of rights were in fact limited to the 
context of consent to, or veto of, medical treatment. The other, plentiful rights and 
duties a parent possesses will endure even if this more limited right regarding 
treatment is terminated upon the child’s satisfaction of the Gillick test. As such, both 
statements may be true, rather than being inherently contradictory as Gilmore 
suggested.12  
 The idea that parental rights can be limited once competence is attained is also evident 
in Lord Fraser’s comments. He states that ‘the degree of parental control actually 
exercised over a particular child [varies] considerably according to his understanding 
                                                 
9 ibid 183-4.  
10 Stephen Gilmore, ‘The Limits of Parental Responsibility’ in Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore and 
Jonathan Herring (eds), Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility (Hart Publishing 2009) 64.  
11 ibid 25 and 75.  
12 ibid 75.  
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and intelligence’ and, further, that to believe that a child remains within the parent’s 
complete control until they reach majority is unrealistic.13 Consequently, this hints that 
parental rights may continue to exist once the child attains competence but, as 
described by Bainham, in a ‘qualified’ form.14 This qualification prevents interference 
with competently made decisions regarding treatment, but will not limit parental 
abilities to exercise control over the child within other fields. Similarly, Lord Scarman 
states that parental rights relating to the child only endure for as long as they are needed 
to protect the child.15 Once competent, arguably that child is no longer in need of 
protection regarding treatment decisions. They have proven themselves intelligent 
enough to assess their own needs, hence dispelling the need for parental control and 
intervention. Again, this supports the conclusion that once competence has been 
attained, parental rights must yield in some way. As such, this thesis purports to show 
that on strict reading of Lord Scarman’s judgment, parents should not retain the ability 
to override the decision of a Gillick competent minor. In other words, competence 
under Gillick should grant the child the capacity to decide regardless of parental 
wishes, providing there are no reasons to doubt the child’s autonomy.16  
 On a similar note, it is important to clarify exactly what rights Gillick grants to minors.  
Once able to prove their competence, it has been commonly assumed that this confers 
upon the child the right to consent and refuse proposed medical treatment.17 Although 
the case itself only involved issues of consent, to interpret the Gillick test as limited to 
                                                 
13 Gillick (n 1) 171.  
14 Andrew Bainham, Children, Parents and the Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1988) 49.  
15 Gillick (n 1) 185.  
16 The potential difference between competence and true autonomy shall be explored within Chapter 
V.  
17 Joe Brierley and Victor Larcher, 'Adolescent autonomy revisited: clinicians need clearer guidance' 
(2016) 42(8) Journal of Medical Ethics 482, 483.  
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these facts would arguably be overly restrictive. This is especially poignant when the 
words of Lord Scarman are examined:  
I would hold that as a matter of law the parental right to determine whether or not their minor 
child below the age of 16 will have medical treatment terminates if and when the child achieves 
a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is 
proposed. (emphasis added)18  
 Lord Scarman explicitly states that parents lose their right to decide whether their 
competent child will or will not have medical treatment. This suggests that the power 
to decide ‘whether or not’ to have treatment will transfer to the child upon their 
satisfaction of the Gillick test. As such, the powers conferred by Gillick encompass 
both a right to consent to and refuse medical treatment. This argument is supported 
within the academic community, with most agreeing that Gillick gave children a real 
choice in their treatment– any other conclusion would be illogical.19 To allow a child 
with sufficient competence to agree with a medical practitioner, but prevent that same 
child disagreeing despite equivalent levels of intelligence and understanding of both 
circumstances would grant no real rights at all. As stated by Eekelaar, without choice, 
rights would be mere duties.20 Consequently, it would be irrational to exclude refusal 
rights without more obvious exclusion of such a right being evident within the Gillick 
judgments. When coupled with the explicit words of Lord Scarman, any alternative 
conclusion limiting these rights would be strained. Nevertheless, once more, this 
assertion has been cast into doubt by subsequent case law, to be discussed in detail 
shortly.  
                                                 
18 Gillick (n 1) 188-9 (Lord Scarman).  
19 For example: JA Devereux, DPH Jones and DL Dickenson, 'Can children withhold consent to 
treatment?' (1993) 306 British Medical Journal 1459, 1460; Taylor (n 2) 83.  
20 John Eekelaar, ‘The Importance of Thinking that Children have Rights' (1992) 6 International 
Journal of Law & the Family 221, 227.  
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Defining ‘understanding’  
 The test for minor’s competence is one of ‘sufficient intelligence and understanding’ 
relating to the procedure involved. However, what is meant by ‘understanding’? This 
is a question addressed by both leading judgments within Gillick, yet with potentially 
contradictory conclusions.21  
 Lord Fraser’s judgment deals with the issue in less detail, however appears to suggest 
that minors only need to demonstrate limited understanding to achieve competence. 
Striking some similarity with the standards set for adults, he suggests that the minor 
need only understand the basic issues involved with the procedure itself, rather than 
delving into deeper concepts such as consequence and social impact.22 This standard 
would mean that, although allowing variation for standards of competence for 
differing procedures depending on their complexity, competence would be quite 
achievable for minors with intelligence and maturity. Nevertheless, despite showing 
support for his fellow Lord’s judgment in general, Lord Scarman developed the 
concept of ‘understanding’ far beyond Lord Fraser’s standards.    
 Lord Scarman took a more holistic view of the standards to be achieved. He suggests 
that, in the context of contraceptive treatment, issues such as the social and moral 
concerns which may arise as a result of pregnancy must be understood for the minor 
to have competence.23 This is certainly a high threshold, and one that goes beyond 
what is required of adults.24 Whereas Lord Fraser’s standards seem fairly low, Lord 
Scarman requires much more of mature minors before granting competence. Despite 
its strong requirements, it is suggested that Lord Scarman’s judgment is the better 
                                                 
21 PN Parkinson, ‘The Gillick Case– Just What Has it Decided?’ [1986] Family Law 11, 11. 
22 Gillick (n 1) 170 (Lord Fraser).  
23 ibid 189 (Lord Scarman).  
24 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (Third Edition, Routledge 2015) 119.  
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option for the Gillick test. Arguably because of his high threshold, minors who manage 
to overcome this and satisfy Gillick should be allotted more respect regarding their 
choices. In other words, the high threshold makes it easier to conclude that children 
with competence deserve an absolute right to capacity, and the right to ‘make their 
own mistakes’ as Eekelaar describes it.25   
 It is also arguable that the two judgments were not intended to be contradictory, as 
Lord Fraser’s discussion of understanding is very much limited compared to that of 
Lord Scarman’s. This is because Lord Fraser merely mentions that a minor must ‘be 
capable of understanding what is proposed’ in terms of treatment, without developing 
his meaning of ‘procedure’ nor the requirements meant by ‘understanding’. 26 
Conversely, Lord Scarman goes on to flesh out the concept of understanding to include 
the consequences and social impact of the decision. As such, it is possible that Lord 
Scarman’s judgment was intended as the authority on the matter, or even as 
complimentary and supplementary to Lord Fraser’s comments due to its more 
extensive exploration of understanding.  
 As shall be seen within Chapter III, Lord Scarman’s higher standard appears to be the 
one embraced by the judiciary in later refusal cases. Nevertheless, this standard is once 
more cast into doubt due to judicial tendencies to expect exceptional levels of 
understanding from minors. As a result, some critique the Gillick test as being far too 
vaguely formulated.27 Gillick is by no means a perfect test. After all, terms such as 
‘intelligence’ and ‘understanding’ are undeniably open to a variety of interpretations. 
                                                 
25 John Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights (1986) 6(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
161, 181-2.  
26 Gillick (n 1) 169 (Lord Fraser).  
27 Emma Cave, ‘Adolescent consent and confidentiality in the UK’ (2009) 16(4) European Journal of 
Health Law 309, 316.  
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As a result, some feel that the test is too easily ‘manipulated’.28 As shall be seen within 
Chapter III, this argument appears to have rung true for mature and arguably 
competent minors seeking to assert their rights to refuse serious or life-saving medical 
treatment.  The test has been used to require unattainably high standards of 
competence for minors, allowing paternalism to take precedence despite the intended 
and praised liberal nature of Gillick.  
 Nevertheless, this is not a reason to abandon the Gillick test altogether. Although 
some suggest that a more suitable option would be to revert to an age-based standard, 
preventing independent decision making on medical issues until the age of 16, this 
would cause troublesome rigidity in the law.29 As highlighted by Lord Scarman in his 
own judgment, the law in this area is bound to be somewhat vague.30 This vagueness 
allows for a precious amount of flexibility in the law, as decisions within the medical 
context can vary heavily depending on individual circumstance.31 When competence 
is a concept so inherently connected with the idea of evolving capabilities, to resort to 
age-based standards would be an affront to the largely heralded progressive nature of 
Gillick in terms of children’s rights to autonomy. As such, this thesis does not aim to 
criticise and offer alternatives to the Gillick test, but to assess its application and 
manipulation within refusal cases.  
The Family Law Reform Act 1969: 16-17 year olds 
 Although not central to the theme of this thesis, as the focus shall be on the application 
of the Gillick test rather than statutory provisions, it is worth mentioning the role of 
the FLRA in relation to minors’ medical consent law. Predating Gillick, this statute 
                                                 
28  ibid.  
29 Gillick (n 1) 186.  
30 ibid. 
31 ibid.  
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marks another glimmer of progress for children’s rights to self-determination, albeit 
in a more limited sense. Section 8(1) relates to the status of 16 and 17 year olds. It 
reads:  
The consent of a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years to any surgical, medical or 
dental treatment which, in the absence of consent, would constitute a trespass to his person, 
shall be as effective as it would be if he were of full age; and where a minor has by virtue of 
this section given an effective consent to any treatment it shall not be necessary to obtain any 
consent for it from his parent or guardian. (emphasis added) 
 This section, therefore, recognises the same rights for mature, competent young adults 
to consent as those above the age of majority. It is largely accepted that the FLRA 
grants young adults a presumption of capacity, akin to the one applicable to adults 
under section 1(2) of the MCA. As such, their rights to consent to treatment are much 
more easily attained than under 16s who enjoy no such presumption. Nevertheless, 
this provision has been fairly consistently interpreted as applying solely to consent.32 
As such, even 16-17 year olds appear to hold lesser rights to refuse than their adult 
counterparts.  
 Nevertheless, the real legal issue comes with cases of refusal. If, as has been 
demonstrated in judicial discussion, the FLRA’s full force is limited to consent alone 
then 16-17 year olds lose the protection of this Act when they seek to assert their rights 
to refuse treatment. In other words, 16-17 year olds still do not enjoy determinative 
control of their medical treatment if they are seeking to refuse. This places young 
adults at a distinct disadvantage to those over the age of 18, as once more they cannot 
be said to have the right to refuse without adult interference and approval.  
                                                 
32 Lynn Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable Patient: Protection and Empowerment (Ashgate 2009) 27.  
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 Another controversy which arises as a result of this provision is the relevant legal test 
to apply to assess competence to make decisions regarding medical treatment. It is not 
made obvious whether the correct test would be Gillick, upon which satisfaction grants 
the same rights to consent and refuse as adults have, or whether the adult test applies 
as a replacement for Gillick for minors over the age of 16.33 Cave argues that the MCA 
test alone is too low a standard to provide adequate protection to minors, and as such 
any application of the MCA would have to be bolstered by common law protections.34 
However, Pattinson contests that the FLRA seeks to treat 16-17 year olds as if they 
were ‘of full age’, meaning that the relevant law would be the test applicable to adults, 
i.e. sections 2 and 3 of the MCA.35 The MCA’s inclusion of 16 and 17 year olds does 
favour the idea that the MCA test has applicability in some regard to young adults, 
nevertheless, the issue is yet to be definitively addressed and resolved. The issues 
regarding the agreeability of the MCA test in assessing all minors’ competence with 
sufficient regard to autonomy shall be further explored within Chapter V. Truthfully, 
both approaches may not be as incompatible as was first though, as Pattinson has also 
advocated for the use of the inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps within the MCA’s 
definitions of competence, which echoes Cave’s suggestions for common law 
reinforcements on the adult test.36  
The test to be applied when assessing the competence of over 16s is therefore 
uncertain, as even the case law paints a confusing picture of the relevant law. It has 
not yet been explicitly acknowledged which test the law will take as determinative in 
                                                 
33 Note that the FLRA predates the MCA considerably, and the MCA does not mention its effects on 
the former Act, muddying the waters as to the more recent Act’s impact on 16 and 17 year olds.  
34 Emma Cave, ‘Goodbye Gillick? Identifying and resolving problems with the concept of child 
competence’ (2014) 34(1) Legal Studies 103, 104.  
35 Shaun D Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (Fourth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2014) 161-2. 
36 Shaun D Pattinson, Medical Law and Ethics (Fifth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell 2017) 143 
(forthcoming).  
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relation to a young adult refusing treatment. In a recent case, a 17-year-old’s ability to 
refuse treatment was discussed in relation to both the common law and statutory tests 
for competence.37 Despite arguably satisfying both tests, her autonomy to decide was 
still denied. As such, the ‘correct’ test may indeed be irrelevant, as satisfaction of 
neither can apparently lead to unquestioned capacity to decide. What is clear is that 
this is yet another circumstance where mature minors are left in the dark concerning 
their legal rights.  
The ‘retreat’ cases: Re R and Re W 
 Despite the arguably liberal focus of the House of Lords in Gillick, and the agreement 
within the academic community that a competent child has a right to choose whether 
or not to undergo medical treatment, subsequent case law has evidenced what has been 
named the ‘retreat from Gillick’.38 This ‘retreat’ began with Re R, where the courts 
were faced with a 15 year old girl seeking to defy medical advice and refuse anti-
psychotic drugs.39 The court concluded that R was not competent to decide for herself, 
yet went on to advise generally on the status of competent minors seeking to refuse 
treatment. In doing so, Lord Donaldson attempted to add a gloss to Gillick. He 
professed that even in the case of a minor with undeniable competence, the court 
retained the ability to overrule a refusal of medical treatment. 40  He denied the 
implication of many academics and judges alike that Gillick competence granted the 
same weight to decisions to consent and refuse treatment. As a torrent of criticism 
poured over this judgment from the academic community, Lord Donaldson took the 
opportunity to alter his limitation on Gillick in a similar subsequent case.  
                                                 
37 An NHS Foundation Hospital v P [2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam). 
38 Taylor (n 2).  
39 Re R (A Minor) (Wardship: Consent to Treatment) [1992] Fam 11.  
40 ibid 26.  
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 Re W once more concerned a mature minor, this time 16 years of age.41 She was 
refusing treatment relating to anorexia nervosa. Rather than revoke his paternalistic 
gloss on Gillick, Lord Donaldson and his fellow judges merely limited the 
circumstances in which a child who satisfies Gillick is denied a decisive voice over 
their own treatment. Here, it is stated that the court may override the decisions of a 
competent minor if that decision would have life-threatening, or permanently 
damaging consequences.42 This not only confirmed a limitation of the rights granted 
to a minor who satisfies the Gillick test, but also extended this logic to young adults 
who attract the statutory protection of the FLRA due to the minor’s age within this 
case.  
 Issues with reconciling these Court of Appeal cases with the House of Lord’s decision 
in Gillick shall be explored. As a result, it shall be argued that these cases are 
questionable at best as binding legal authorities and even less convincing where Lord 
Donaldson’s reasoning is concerned. This could mean that the application of the retreat 
cases within the lower courts has been in error.   
Conflict with Gillick 
 This section shall attempt to demonstrate an innate lack of coherence between the Re 
R and W judgments and the judicially superior House of Lords decision in Gillick. 
Firstly, the legitimacy of Lord Donaldson’s suggestions for concurrent powers to 
consent shall be examined critically, ultimately concluding there to be a lack of 
verification for this line of argument in the context of the Gillick judgment. Secondly, 
the general principles underlying both judgments shall be explored, and their inherent 
contradictions exposed. Finally, the subsequent section shall address the legal status 
                                                 
41 Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1993] Fam 64.  
42 ibid 88 (Balcolmbe LJ) and 82 (Lord Donaldson).  
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of Lord Donaldson’s comments. Ultimately, it shall be concluded that these cases may 
have been falsely taken as binding authorities.  
 Lord Donaldson is insistent within both Re R and Re W that Gillick does not preclude 
the existence of ‘concurrent powers’ of consent in minors with competence and those 
with parental responsibility. He does so by utilising the words within Lord Scarman’s 
judgment very narrowly indeed. Lord Scarman states that parental powers ‘to 
determine whether or not’ their child has treatment ‘terminates’ upon the attainment 
of Gillick competence.43 At face value, most have interpreted this to mean that the 
child’s rights take over the parental rights, allowing the child to be the ‘sole controller’ 
of their own body once they have competence. 44  Nevertheless, Lord Donaldson 
disagreed.  
 In an attempt to preserve paternalistic control over minors, he employs what can be 
seen as a form of linguistic manipulation to allow Lord Scarman’s speech to support 
his own somewhat contradictory conclusion. Lord Donaldson states that Gillick 
competence only deprives parents of their right to determine their child’s fate 
regarding medical treatment. He distinguishes this from a right to consent to treatment, 
a more limited right, through use of the ‘keyholder’ analogy.45 He suggests that before 
a child attains competence, their parents hold the key to their consent to allow a doctor 
to perform treatment. Once competence is attained, the parents lose the sole right to 
determine their child’s treatment, as the child gains their own key. As such, a parent 
loses the power to veto consent given by their child as a keyholder, whilst retaining 
their own power to consent in the face of a refusal by the child.46 Lord Donaldson 
                                                 
43 Gillick (n 1) 188-9.  
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preserved this idea of concurrent powers within Re W, altering his metaphor to that of 
a ‘flak jacket’ to prevent a child with competence ‘lock[ing]’ the door to treatment as 
well as ‘unlock[ing]’ it.47 Nevertheless, W went even further, applying this logic to 
those who fall within the protection of the FLRA, meaning that even those over the 
age of 16 could not have complete control of their own bodies if refusing treatment.  
 Some feel that this conclusion is a legal possibility, in other words that Lord 
Donaldson’s interpretation of Lord Scarman’s judgment is a potentially legitimate 
one. Whilst not agreeing whole-heartedly with the decision in Re W, one such 
argument comes from Stephen Gilmore and Jonathan Herring. They argue that 
concurrent powers could be possible due to differing standards of competence for 
different ‘types’ of refusal.48 They distinguish refusing consent to a certain treatment, 
which requires the same level of understanding as consent, and refusal of all treatment. 
For example, if a child is recommended to have a specific type of treatment to alleviate 
their condition, and understands entirely what that procedure entails as well as its 
consequences, then they would have the competence to consent or refuse consent. 
However, if that same child refuses not only the proposed treatment, but states that 
they wish to have no treatment at all, then despite having the ability to understand the 
issues regarding the proposed treatment, that child could still lack the competence to 
refuse all treatment if they did not understand the consequences of the latter decision.49 
In this scenario, if refusing all treatment without the competence to do so, the parents 
could provide the consent to the original treatment as the child would lack full 
competence. In some scenarios, the refusal of one treatment and the refusal of all 
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treatments could be the same thing, as one treatment may be all which is possible to 
save the child.50 The authors argue that whilst concurrent powers may exist where a 
child has the competence to merely refuse consent for specific treatments, as they 
could concurrently lack the competence to refusal all treatment,51 once a child attains 
the higher standards required to refuse all treatment, alternative parental powers of 
override cease and the child becomes the arbiter of their own fate.52  
 Although their reasoning is commendable and logical, even Gilmore and Herring’s 
limited support cannot justify the broadest reading of Lord Donaldson’s judgment. 
Namely, that no limit to the extent of concurrent powers exists, no matter what level 
of competence the child can demonstrate. Lord Donaldson does not suggest any level 
of competence which could ever lead to absolute autonomy for minors, taking his 
judgment beyond the realms of justification using Herring and Gilmore’s arguments. 
As expressed by Lilian Edwards, Lord Donaldson’s interpretation is ‘somewhat 
forced’.53 Gillick evidently intended to grant mature minors control over their own 
medical treatment, and as discussed above Lord Scarman’s language hints heavily at 
parental rights ceasing once competence is achieved as discussed above. Even Lord 
Donaldson himself admits his interpretation may be incorrect.54 Although some have 
attempted to logically justify the potential for concurrent powers, Lord Donaldson’s 
arguments are ultimately unconvincing.  
 A further argument employed by Lord Donaldson to justify his gloss to Gillick is that 
without the ability for parents or the court to give consent where a minor refuses 
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treatment, doctors would be presented with an ‘intolerable dilemma’.55 But what is 
this ‘dilemma’? According to Lord Donaldson, this is the threat of civil and criminal 
charges if he/she wrongly concludes a child’s competence to decide.56 Nevertheless, 
this argument is also unconvincing. This ‘dilemma’ was, at the time, equally 
applicable to the assessment of competence for those over the age of majority.57 
Doctors ran the same risk of committing a crime and a tort when deciding to override 
the decisions of potentially incompetent adults; nevertheless, this is a risk which the 
law regards as tolerable in light of competing interests relating to respect for 
autonomy. When placed into context, Lord Donaldson’s logic was inherently flawed 
and consequently, the basis for his judgments in the retreat cases is further discredited.  
 Finally, and arguably most significantly, there is an inherent disconnect between the 
underlying rationales of the Gillick decision and the retreat cases. Whilst Gillick has 
been heralded as a progressive step for children’s liberation and rights, Re R and Re 
W are undeniably paternalistic. Kennedy describes the restriction of competent 
children’s rights as ‘[driving] a coach and horses through Gillick’.58 In other words, 
the progress made for children’s rights to self-determination in the recognition of their 
intelligence and maturity is retracted entirely by denying minors the ability to refuse 
medical treatment without the potential for paternalistic interference. Lord Donaldson 
introduced a ‘radical departure’ from Gillick,59 in that he created asymmetry between 
the competence to consent to and refuse treatment. This has ‘marginalised’ the 
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protection of mature minors at law, with one right being supported over the other.60 
As discussed in the context of Gillick, the right to consent without a converse ability 
to refuse leaves no real choice at all. As such, the law in this area is now overwhelmed 
by ‘virtually unbridled paternalism’.61  
 Additionally, a further contradiction with Gillick arises. Gillick denies reliance on 
anything but the child’s intelligence and maturity within its legal test.62 However, Lord 
Donaldson links the assessment of a child’s competence with the consequences of their 
decision and their age through the allowance of paternalistic intervention in life or 
death scenarios. This is inherently incompatible with Gillick’s functional test. Basing 
the law on outcome and age means that competence has no real meaning within 
capacity law.63 If a child can be overruled no matter their degree of competence at law, 
then this invalidates Gillick as a meaningful authority. If true, then Re R and Re W 
present ‘a rare legal phenomenon indeed’: the Court of Appeal effectively overruling 
a decision of the House of Lords.64 Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated, Lord 
Donaldson’s reasoning is far from water-tight. To have such cataclysmic 
consequences as to invalidate a superior and long-standing judicial authority, arguably 
the ‘retreat’ cases would require much stronger legal reasoning.   
 The Re R and Re W litigations have sent this area of law into disarray. As a result, 
providing legal advice for minors with any degree of accuracy is incredibly difficult.65 
Lord Donaldson’s judgments mean that it is uncertain whether a minor could ever be 
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intelligent enough to obtain full autonomous control. They are left in the dark 
regarding their rights to refuse medical treatment. As shall be argued in further 
chapters, these cases are not only puzzling in themselves, but the judiciary’s approach 
to their application –or lack of– causes further concern for young people’s rights.  
Precedent or pretender? Issues with Re R and Re W 
 Re R and Re W have been taken as binding authorities in subsequent years. 66 
Nevertheless, it shall be demonstrated that this conclusion is at the very least 
questionable. It is suggested that neither R nor W were unequivocally held to be 
competent by the Court of Appeal. As such, Lord Donaldson’s comments limiting the 
force of Gillick competence for minors were merely obiter statements, technically 
holding no decisive weight for future courts. If true, this means that Gillick should 
remain the authority on this issue. Consequently, as stated previously, it is generally 
accepted that if a child satisfies the Gillick test they gain the right to consent or refuse 
treatment without interference. This would mean that the law in this area has been 
wrongly decided since the early 1990s, and the ‘retreat from Gillick’ can be reversed 
if a suitable case was to arise.  
 In terms of Re R, it is evident that the comments of Lord Donaldson regarding the 
override of decisions made with competence were obiter. The child was unequivocally 
stated to incapable of satisfying the Gillick test due to fluctuating mental capabilities 
as a result of her psychosis. As such, the real question comes with the subsequent case 
of Re W. Here, the result is less certain.  W suffered from anorexia nervosa. Although 
Lord Donaldson shows some lenience towards Thorpe J’s previous judgment,67 he 
also speaks of W’s condition in a manner which questions his commitment to 
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supporting the previous court’s conclusion on the child’s competence. Lord 
Donaldson fails to make a definitive statement on the girl’s competence, as do the 
other judges. As such, this issue is open to debate. Although some feel that W was 
seen as competent by the Court of Appeal in order to take comments within Re R on 
minor’s rights to refuse beyond being obiter,68 it is argued that the judgment’s tone is 
much more inherently paternalistic. Although likely to be eager to fortify his previous 
dicta within Re R, Lord Donaldson appears unable to resist the paternalistic urge to 
deny acknowledgement of the minor’s competence. He expresses doubts about Thorpe 
J’s conclusion that W had ‘sufficient understanding’ to satisfy Gillick due to the nature 
of anorexia as an illness in his eyes being ‘capable of destroying the ability to make 
an informed choice.’69 Consequently, although agreeing with the previous court’s 
conclusion that treatment could be ordered without the child’s consent, his agreement 
on the issue of competence is less obvious. If W was, as is believed, seen to be 
incompetent, this once more leaves Lord Donaldson’s comments regarding the court’s 
ability to overrule a refusal made by a competent child as merely obiter dicta.70 As a 
result, these cases could arguably present no real threat to Gillick, as the case was 
decided in the House of Lords, a higher court. Nevertheless, it would appear that the 
judiciary has not adopted this view within subsequent case law, applying Re R and Re 
W as binding precedent despite issues of inherent contention with Gillick.  
Consequently, the idea that the retreat cases could be easily deemed obiter and 
overruled is perhaps a little too simplistic. The judiciary appear have treated the ability 
of the courts and parents to override a decision made with competence as binding ratio 
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for the past two decades.71 As such, the idea that the judgment would be viewed 
otherwise now is highly unlikely.  
 Even if W was ultimately deemed competent, it is still arguable that this case was 
wrongly decided. It is very much possible that the case ignores a relevant area of law: 
mental health legislation. Rather than tokenistic mention of such law, with Donaldson 
stating that W ‘[p]robably’ did not fall within the Mental Health Act 1983 (hereinafter 
MHA), arguably this avenue for intervention should have been more seriously 
considered. Lawson professes that W’s case was in fact the perfect example of where 
the MHA should be invoked.72 This Act allows for minors with mental health related 
illnesses to be treated without consent, even if they can be seen to have competence. 
Consequently, through use of the MHA Lord Donaldson could have acknowledged 
her competence, showing support for mature minors’ rights and abilities, yet still he 
would not have left a vulnerable child alone to make life-threatening decisions. It is 
also seen that the MHA provides further safeguards specifically designed for those 
with mental health problems.73 Nevertheless, counsel on both sides refused to present 
this argument to the court, rendering its formal discussion impossible. Even so, this 
exclusion shows how such ignorance of potentially relevant legal avenues could in 
fact hinder minors’ protection. This is yet another way in which these authorities can, 
and should, be questioned.  
 It shall be demonstrated within subsequent chapters that, even if a valid authority, Re 
W should not continue to govern the future of children’s rights to autonomy in the 
medical sphere. The current confusion left by Lord Donaldson’s judgments is 
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unacceptable. Minors deserve some degree of legal certainty regarding the test which 
will determine their fate, and the standards to be achieved to attain control of their 
bodies. Currently, this lies in disarray. 
Conclusions on the Current Law 
 This chapter has aimed to provide an overview of the current law governing minor’s 
rights to control their own medical treatment. Gillick provided a step forward for 
children’s rights and autonomy. The idea that Gillick only allows a right to consent, 
and not to refuse, has been discredited as irrational and ill-founded. Additionally, the 
threshold of ‘intelligence and understanding’ from Lord Scarman’s judgment have 
been identified as the more generally applicable standards: high, but potentially 
attainable for suitably mature adolescents. Although vaguely formulated, the Gillick 
test allows for a precious level of flexibility required by this area of law. Medical 
procedures are so diverse and ever-changing that a rigid, inflexible standard of 
competence would be entirely unsuitable. Although this fluid nature leaves the test 
open to exploitation, evidenced within the Re R and Re W judgments, the flexibility of 
Gillick could be used to adapt medical law to keep up with a society increasingly 
embracing children’s rights and autonomy more generally.  
 It has been argued that Gillick’s message of child liberation has been questionably 
tainted by Re R and Re W. It has been proven to be a distinct possibility that these 
cases are wrongly seen as binding precedent, which may erroneously displace the 
validity of a Gillick competent minor’s decision. Not only are the most controversial 
aspects of these cases very arguably obiter in nature, the decisions contradict the 
rationale and judgements of a superior court in Gillick. Nevertheless, it appears that 
despite these issues, the courts are upholding Re R and Re W as binding authorities. 
As such, Chapter III will seek to examine and review the use, or lack of use, of the 
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principles set out by the retreat cases in subsequent refusal cases. It shall be argued 
that the judges are reluctant to employ these ‘authorities’, perhaps due to their dubious 
nature, and instead have distorted and moulded the Gillick test beyond recognition in 
order to maintain a less controversial paternalistic hold on mature minors. 
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Chapter III: Refusals and Paternalism: A Misuse of Gillick? 
 
 As addressed in the previous chapter, the law on adolescent refusal is far from clear 
cut. The weight granted to Gillick competence is uncertain when faced with minors 
who wish to make life-changing medical decisions. 1  To attempt to clarify the 
judiciary’s stance in this regard, the case law on adolescent refusals of treatment shall 
be examined within this chapter. Although limited in scope, the case law shows a 
worrying trend. The courts tend to avoid the principles within Re W, however, this has 
not translated into empowerment for mature, intelligent minors who wish to refuse. 
Instead, the judiciary appear to have grasped at any chance to label the child 
incompetent, making their denial of the child’s determinative capacity possible 
without use of Lord Donaldson’s controversial judgment.2 It shall be argued that the 
decisions in these cases have been poorly reasoned, with the Gillick test being applied 
in a tokenistic manner or even ignored. 3  Judicial avoidance of Re W’s direct 
application within refusal cases has resulted in confusion regarding minors’ rights to 
refuse and the relevant tests for competence. The dubious tactics employed by the 
judiciary in such cases shall be evidenced through the case law.  
 Although some feel that the outcomes of these cases, and their aim in preserving life 
can be viewed as morally commendable regarding competent minors,4  this thesis aims 
to challenge this view. The right to consent without a concurrent right to refuse leaves 
no real choice at all for children.5 Although any form of clarity would be welcomed in 
this area, even if this means that minors have no ability to refuse treatment until they 
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reach the age of majority,6 it shall be concluded that the most appropriate way forward 
would be to respect the decisions of those who manage to attain Gillick competence. 
In other words, capacity to determine one’s own medical treatment, whatever the 
consequence, should flow from the attainment of competence under the law.  
Examining the Case Law: Competence and Convenience   
 Very few cases reach the courts regarding mature minors who are refusing life-saving 
medical treatment.7 This is feasibly because most dissenting children change their 
minds and consent to treatment as a result of discussions with family and/or medical 
professionals, or perhaps due to eventual acquiescence regarding the refusal on behalf 
of the doctors. As an example of the latter scenario, Hannah Jones at 13 was allowed 
to refuse a heart transplant required due to her battle with leukaemia.8 Following some 
debate with her doctors, her decision to refuse was accepted without judicial challenge. 
Although Hannah eventually changed her mind and chose to have the life-saving 
procedure, she was allowed to be the arbiter of her own fate without the involvement 
of the judiciary. Nevertheless, where such cases are brought to the courts, the outcome 
tends to be very different to that seen within Hannah’s case. When serious cases are 
presented to the court and a child’s life hangs in the balance, there has only been one 
outcome: the refusal of the child is overridden. Although the judiciary’s desire for such 
an outcome is understandable, this chapter shall cast doubt on the authenticity of the 
courts’ assessment of competence in such cases. Rather than accept a minor’s 
competence and maturity by granting capacity, the judiciary have been evasive or 
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manipulative regarding the application of the Gillick test where the child’s potential 
competence could have interfered with their desire to override the refusal. Despite 
having the power to override even a competent minor’s refusal, the judiciary have in 
all but one instance avoided the direct use of this controversial principle from Re W.9 
As such, the true motivations of the court shall be discussed, suggesting that the 
judiciary have struggled to overcome paternalistic impulses in refusal cases, leading 
to outcome-based decisions rather than meaningful employment of the legal test for 
competence.10  
Re M: Ignoring the Gillick Test 
 Amongst the most controversial cases on the subject of adolescent refusal is Re M.11 
Here, somewhat similarly to Hannah’s situation, a 15-year-old girl refused a heart 
transplant needed to save her life. The doctors involved sought a declaration to proceed 
with treatment without her consent. Despite the judge in question recognising M’s 
intelligence and maturity when asked about the proposed treatment, her refusal was 
overridden.12 Johnson J’s decision was made, remarkably, without a single mention of 
Gillick. As such, there was no assessment of M’s competence at all. Instead, Johnson 
J based his override of her decision on the suggestion that M had been ‘overwhelmed’ 
by the decision with which she was faced because, unlike Hannah who had been ill 
for a long period of time, M’s health deteriorated suddenly and without warning.13 
Although a potentially valid reason to challenge M’s competence had Gillick been 
used, Johnson J provides no further explanation or evidence for his decision and 
otherwise applauds M’s intelligence and maturity.14 Rather than relying on the legal 
                                                 
9 An NHS Foundation Hospital v P [2014] EWHC 1650 (Fam).  
10 Michael Freeman, ‘Rethinking Gillick’ (2005) 13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 201, 
212.  
11 Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097.  
12 ibid 1100 (Johnson J).  
13 ibid 1100.  
14 ibid 1097.  
34 
 
test for competence and applying this to M, Johnson J chose to base his decision to 
deny determinative capacity to M based on speculative opinions about her state of 
mind.  
 Despite the judge’s implications to the contrary, M could have potentially satisfied 
Gillick on the facts presented within the case. She justifies her decision to refuse the 
transplant with insightful reasoning. M states that although she understands that she 
would die without the transplant, and this was not something she wished for. 15  
Nevertheless, she expressed that she did not wish to have a lifetime of drugs following 
the procedure. She also stated that she would rather have lived her 15 years with her 
own heart, than live with the heart of another. 16  Therefore, M can be seen to 
demonstrate an understanding not only of the procedure of the transplant, but also the 
aftercare in the form of drug therapy. Looking back to the Gillick test, its requires the 
minor to demonstrate ‘sufficient intelligence and understanding’ of the procedure 
proposed.17  Even if interpreted so as to encompass a broad understanding of the 
consequences of the refusal, M could potentially satisfy this test. She understood that 
her death was an inevitable consequence of her refusal. In fact, some, such as Michael 
Freeman, feel that M was certainly competent in the Gillick sense.18  
 Nonetheless, this is not a foregone conclusion. Johnson J could have reached the same 
decision –to override her refusal– whilst still employing the relevant legal test for 
competence. As mentioned above, M had been suddenly stricken with a very serious 
illness, differentiating her from an experienced patient such as Hannah Jones.19 As 
                                                 
15 ibid 1100.  
16 ibid.  
17 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112, 113-114.  
18 Freeman (n 10) 210.  
19 Sheila AM McLean, ‘Whose Decision is it Anyway?’ The BMJ.com (14 November 2008)   
<http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2008/11/14/sheila-mclean-whose-decision-is-it-anyway/> accessed 21 
June 2017.  
35 
 
such, Johnson J’s assertion that she may have been overwhelmed and rendered unable 
to make a competent decision despite her intelligence is feasible. Nevertheless, due to 
Johnson J’s lack of assessment of M’s competence and abilities, discussion M’s 
potential to satisfy Gillick is restricted to mere speculation. Consequently, the 
obfuscation of the law and ignorance of Gillick can be seen to be an even more 
questionable step taken by a court desperate to find reason for intervention.  
 The reasoning within M’s case shows a reluctance within the judiciary to engage with 
minors’ competence. This thesis aims to suggest that this avoidance is linked to a 
reluctance to directly apply the more controversial aspects of Lord Donaldson’s 
judgment in Re W. Namely, this would be the override of a competent, mature minor 
seeking to refuse treatment rather than overriding an incompetent minor. Rather than 
having to confront the potential of M’s competence and then overrule her refusal, the 
judge chose to ignore the legal test entirely. This is because the override of a 
competently made decision is a much more controversial way to overrule a minor’s 
refusal, as it interferes far more significantly with the autonomy rights of competent 
individuals.20 It is suggested that the court in this case chose to ignore Gillick so as to 
allow for a more convenient, meaning less controversial, override of the child’s 
autonomy. 
 Ignoring Gillick in refusal cases such as M’s does the law no favours. Although the 
judiciary may be attempting to save a minor’s life, without doubt an admirable 
objective, this does more harm than good for legal certainty. This case further confuses 
the rights of minors to refuse treatment, and the relevant tests which apply when they 
seek to do so. Re M appears to show that Gillick is no longer a factor which needs to 
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be considered where a minor’s refusal is concerned. After all, following the retreat 
cases, Gillick competence is no longer a determinative factor when it comes to 
granting capacity for minors. Nevertheless, Re W itself still holds competence as a 
relevant issue to consider when determining whether the court or a parent should be 
allowed to override a minor’s choice to refuse treatment. As such, the relevance of 
Gillick is entirely confounded due to the judiciary’s apparent desperation to avoid 
engaging with minors’ competence. This confusion is further exasperated when 
further retreat cases which do in fact cite and focus upon the child’s ability to satisfy 
Gillick are considered. In fact, further manipulation and confusion arises from such 
cases due to their application and interpretation of the requirements for competence.  
Re E and Re L: Manipulating Gillick  
 As opposed to ignoring Gillick in its entirety, as seen in Re M, some refusal cases do 
in fact utilise the test. However, it shall be shown that judicial manipulation of this 
flexible common law test has occurred within refusal cases involving mature, 
intelligent minors in order to favour the court’s intervention through findings of 
incompetence. Once more, the case law exhibits evidence of judicial avoidance of the 
controversial power to override competent minors through misuse of the Gillick test.  
 The manipulation of Gillick’s requirements can most poignantly be seen in Re E21 and 
Re L.22 Both cases involved mature minors, E a 15-year-old male and L a 14-year-old 
female, who sought to refuse life-saving blood transfusions as a result of their 
Jehovah’s Witness faith. Both were fervently committed to their religion, L, for 
example, had taken out a ‘no blood’ card two years prior to the incident which left her 
in need of an urgent blood transfusion. 23   Despite both minors expressing their 
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absolute commitment to refusing blood and the judges agreeing that both 
demonstrated a mature, intelligent understanding of the fatal consequences of their 
decision, they were deemed Gillick incompetent. Nevertheless, despite taking 
consideration of the Gillick test within each judgment, it is suggested that the decisions 
in these cases were never truly based upon competence. Instead, this thesis shall aim 
to show that in cases where a child attempts to refuse life-saving treatment, it is the 
fatal outcome of refusal which is the focus of the court. The judiciary show favour in 
findings of incompetence, which justify their paternalistic intervention regarding 
refusals more readily than cases involving competent minors as discussed within the 
context of Re M. This outcome-based approach has led to the manipulation of the 
Gillick test and legal requirements for competence, fostering confusion within this area 
of law.  
 The judges rejected the idea that E and L had Gillick competence based upon the 
minors’ lack of understanding of the nature of their deaths should they refuse the 
transfusions. 24  Although this appears to fall within Gillick’s requirements of 
‘sufficient understanding’, there is more to this conclusion than meets the eye. In fact, 
E and L had never been provided with the information surrounding the nature of their 
deaths. It was thought too grisly and sombre a topic to be forced to discuss with the 
minors.25 As such, they had no chance to achieve competence at all. In essence, the 
judiciary had pre-determined E and L’s status as incompetent minors due to their 
failure to properly investigate why information so crucial to the determination of 
competence was withheld. Their competence was assessed before they had all the 
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requisite information required to make a valid decision at law.26 This choice shall be 
questioned.  
 It shall be suggested that the judiciary have in these circumstances manipulated not 
only the requirements of understanding under Gillick, but have conflated two of the 
requirements for a legally valid consent or refusal regarding treatment. Firstly, the 
outcome in both cases appears to have been based on a lack of communication with 
the patient, rather than the child’s competence.27 Nevertheless, this lack of information 
should not have been an issue for competence at all. This is because competence 
relates to the child’s ability to understand relevant factors and consequences involved 
with their decision, not their actual understanding.28 As such, the courts should have 
focused on the minors’ intelligence and maturity regarding the levels of understanding 
that would be required in order to make the decision at hand. In this sense, denying 
the minors in these cases competence based on their lack of access to specific 
information regarding the decision suggests that the judges were requiring the minors 
to show actual understanding, misinterpreting –perhaps intentionally– the meaning of 
competence.29  
 Additionally, the denial of competence in Re E and Re L was based on their lack of 
understanding of the nature of their deaths, which sets the bar for competence at an 
incredibly high standard. Already, Gillick goes beyond the levels of understanding 
required by adults. The adult test requires only a demonstration of the ability to 
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understand the procedure in question.30 In fact, case law has shown that the threshold 
is at times rather low. For example, regarding consent to and refusal of contraception, 
an adult need only understand the immediate consequences of not using 
contraceptives, rather than the long-term consequences such as childbirth and 
motherhood. 31  Adults also enjoy a presumption of capacity, further lowering the 
burden on those seeking to make their own medical decisions.32 Conversely, minors 
must understand issues such as the social and familial consequences of pregnancy in 
order to be considered competent and have a chance at the determinative capacity 
which is the general default position for adults.33  
 Yet, even with this higher standard of competence, the judges in Re E and Re L went 
even further. By requiring that the children involved understand not only that they 
would die as a result of their refusal, but the specific details of the nature of that death, 
it is argued that this goes far beyond any realistically attainable standard for minors. 
In fact, Hagger and Bainham have expressed the opinion that most adults would 
struggle to satisfy such competency standards.34 As such, the high benchmark for 
understanding applied to E and L can once more be seen as an effort by the judges to 
ensure the outcome they desired, namely the conclusion that the child lacked 
competence and could thus be easily overridden in their refusal of life-saving 
treatment. These cases evidence a manipulation of the flexibility within the Gillick test 
to the court’s paternalistic advantage, acting as a barrier to competence and subsequent 
capacity for mature minors.35  
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 The requirement of actual understanding, and the high standards required under the 
guise of the Gillick test played perfectly to the judiciary’s favour in these cases. They 
wished to permit treatment for the children due to the fatal consequences of allowing 
the minors determinative capacity. In fact, this is a trend more generally within refusal 
cases where a life is at stake, shown perfectly within Ward J’s judgment in Re E, where 
her states that the court should be ‘very slow to allow an infant to martyr himself’.36 
Although the sentiment is understandable, the undertone of the judgment is very much 
protective, rather than suggestive of empowerment. Ward J even uses the term ‘infant’, 
despite the case relating to a child of 15. This implies, once more, that the judiciary 
are inherently predisposed to view children as in need of protection, incapable of 
making important decisions such as the refusal of medical treatment without adult 
supervision and guidance. It is suggested that the manipulation of the requirements for 
understanding was a tactic employed within these cases in order to allow for the 
simpler, less controversial override of the minors’ wishes.37 As mentioned before, 
judges have attempted, where possible, to avoid directly applying the override power 
allotted within Re W to competent minors. Instead, this thesis aims to demonstrate 
evidence within refusal cases of dubious judicial tactics seeking to allow at times 
questionable findings of incompetence, in turn avoiding the difficult judicial decision 
to overrule a competent, mature minor through use of a contested and controversial 
legal authority.  
 The judiciary not only appear to have applied a standard far higher than that implied 
within Gillick, but in requiring actual understanding from the children involved the 
judiciary’s manipulation of the law may have created legal issues which stretch 
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beyond the Gillick test. It shall be argued that the judges in these cases conflate the 
formal requirements of a legally valid consent or refusal regarding proposed treatment. 
A legally valid decision requires three things: capacity on the behalf of the individual, 
sufficient information for the decision to be based upon and, finally, for the decision 
to be a voluntary one for the patient.38 These cases evidence a conflation of the former 
two categories, namely capacity and sufficient information.  If a minor is seen to have 
competence, then they would be able to understand all relevant information regardless 
of whether or not they have actually been presented with such information. In other 
words, a lack of information should never deny a minor competence, as competence 
does not require actual understanding. Once proved competent, the patient should be 
granted all the information required in order for him/her to properly exercise that 
competence. As such, if the minors could have understood the information relating to 
the nature of their deaths, the judges should have ordered that information be presented 
to them, the outcome being that the minors should have been granted the capacity to 
decide their fate without judicial intervention. Therefore, the denial of competence 
based on a lack of information can be seen as a conflation of the requirements of 
mental competence and the requirement of sufficient information. This is yet another 
way in which the judiciary’s intervention in potentially competent minors’ decisions 
has led to a lack of clarity within the law. The court’s focus on the fatal outcome should 
they not intervene has led to the conflation, manipulation, and confusion not only of 
the requirements of Gillick, but of the overarching requirements of a legally valid 
decision regarding medical treatment more broadly.   
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The above discussion of the Re E and Re L litigations supports this thesis’ suspicion 
that the judiciary appear to be driven by the outcome of the decision –that the child 
would die without intervention– rather than basing their decision on an assessment of 
the child’s competence. As such, the Gillick test, heralded as a success for children’s 
rights and autonomy, can be seen to be manipulated within Re E and Re L in order to 
allow for an easier override of the potentially competent minors’ refusals.39  This 
approach could push the court’s paternalistic protection beyond those who genuinely 
require it. If truly competent, a minor should not be dealt with paternalistically, but 
should instead be empowered to take control of their own decisions. As shown above, 
Gillick sets a higher standard than that required by adults. Hence, surely such 
intelligent and mature minors should be recognised as having real, meaningful rights 
when it comes to their own medical treatment. Nevertheless, it has been shown that 
the judiciary are willing to go to extreme lengths, ignoring and indeed manipulating 
the current law in order to avoid this conclusion.  
 It can be seen from the above case analysis that the Gillick test is applied in a rather 
inconsistent manner within refusal cases. The courts have tended to avoid direct 
application of the Re R and Re W principles, preferring to find ‘convenient’ and at 
times ‘artificial’ findings of incompetence to justify ignorance of the child’s often 
intelligent and justifiable views.40 The courts seem to base their decisions on the 
patient’s status as a minor, rather than their intellectual abilities and competence, a 
premise which can be questioned as a justified reason to steadfastly overrule 
autonomous medical decisions. This chapter shall go on to question the focus of the 
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judiciary on the age of majority as a gateway to competent thinking, as well as the 
questionable application of Gillick in an area of law where competence appears to have 
no impact. If a child can never competently refuse treatment, it shall be argued that to 
continue to assess competence is to obfuscate minor’s rights and lead to uncertainty in 
the law. Ultimately, minors need clarity regarding their legal rights. 
Unsustainable Legal Fallacies: Arguments for Change 
 As has been demonstrated by a close examination of the case law, the courts have 
repeatedly avoided the hard questions presented by the Re W dicta. Whilst the 
underlying motive of protecting children from harm, suffering and death is 
understandable, the avoidant tactics and dubious reasoning used by the judiciary are 
less defensible.41  Not only does the reasoning take advantage of the Gillick test, 
twisting its requirements to match the court’s desired outcome, it leaves the rights of 
minors to refuse entirely unclear. Legal clarity and lack of arbitrariness within the law 
are central principles of the rule of law, which ought to guide the common law and the 
judiciary.42 Currently, as explored above, it would appear that the judiciary are ruling 
under their own moral discretion, rather than using the Gillick test and other authorities 
available to them, leading to decisions of an arbitrary nature. This, according to 
Bingham, is the ‘antithesis of the rule of law’.43 If the truth is that a minor, regardless 
of their intelligence and maturity, can never legally refuse treatment it is questionable 
why the courts continue to assess competence at all. As analysis of the case law 
suggests, competency assessments, when employed at all, appears to have no weight 
on the outcome of judicial decisions in this area. Consideration of the need for legal 
clarity under the rule of law seems to have been neglected within this area. Instead, 
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the judiciary appear driven by the need to protect children from decisions they see as 
unwise and unfavourable, causing confusion regarding the rights of mature minors.  
 The lack of consideration of competence can once more be seen in Re P.44 Here, a 
Jehovah’s Witness very close to turning 17 sought to refuse blood transfusions which 
would potentially be needed to treat a pre-existing medical condition should his 
condition deteriorate.45 Despite acknowledging that P’s beliefs were ‘established’ and 
committed, Johnson J thought the treatment was in his best interests, and granted a 
declaration overriding his refusal.46 This conclusion was reached, as with M’s case, 
without any reference to Gillick.47 There was also no mention of the FLRA, nor his 
rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).48 In a 
very short judgement, Johnson states that despite being ‘reluctant’ to do so, he feels 
the treatment would best suit P’s interests due to the judiciary’s duty to ‘preserve’ 
minors until they reach the age of majority.49 For P, the lack of engagement with the 
relevant legal tests for competence meant that his intellect and maturity had no impact 
on his right to self-determination. P could not have known what was required of him 
to have his decision respected, as the only legal tests available to him, Gillick and the 
MCA test via section 8 FLRA, were ignored entirely. As such, the refusal cases show 
a lack of respect for legal clarity in relation to children’s rights and the rule of law, as 
minors cannot be sure of the prerequisites for, or even the existence of, their right to 
refuse treatment.  Instead of using the available legal tests, Johnson J uses the child’s 
age as a justification for his paternalistic conclusion. This case provides further 
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evidence for the assertion that the patient’s status as a minor, rather than his or her 
competence, is the decisive factor for the courts.  
 The focus on a perceived judicial duty to ‘preserve’ minors until they reach 18 as a 
reason to deny competence and determinative capacity flies in the face of the Gillick 
test. There is no requirement that age should play a factor in achieving competence 
and as such, Johnson J’s reasoning goes even further than purely ignoring Gillick. It 
entirely contradicts the test by basing the decision on the outcome –that a child would 
die as a result of the refusal– and age-based status rather than focusing on the 
competence of that child. 50  This focus on age over ability has the potential to 
egregiously harm principles of autonomy, harm which can be demonstrated through 
the fate of the minor from the aforementioned Re E. Despite having lost the right to 
competently refuse blood transfusions at 15, it was later revealed that E had 
consistently refused further treatment until he finally reached the age of 18. As he had 
reached the age of majority, his competent decision was then accepted and he died 
shortly afterwards.51 Despite the judiciary using the age of majority as a hallmark of 
autonomous decision making and freedom within cases such as Re P, it is argued that 
E’s case demonstrates the fallacies involved with basing competence and capacity 
upon this milestone birthday. Through his consistent and fervent refusal of blood 
products, it can be seen that E’s religious convictions and opinions towards his forced 
treatment had not changed in the years which followed his court case. Additionally, it 
would be ludicrous to say that E’s competence was extraordinarily improved upon the 
morning of his 18th birthday.52 The focus on ‘preserving’ children until they reach the 
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age of majority can therefore be viewed as an unnecessarily protective judicial stance. 
Competence was not at the forefront of Johnson J’s mind in Re P, the case’s potential 
outcome –P’s death– was. It is argued that more weight ought to be granted to the 
concept of evolving capabilities, meaning that strict, chronological age is not a 
sufficient indicator of experience and intellect, a concept which is inherent in the 
Gillick test itself.53 Once a child has demonstrated the high levels of understanding 
required by Gillick, it would be unnecessarily paternalistic and condescending to deem 
such highly intelligent children as vulnerable and in need of judicial protection.54   
 It appears that the judiciary tend to view minors, no matter how intelligent or mature, 
as inherently helpless and in need of protection.55 As such, it is argued that competence 
currently holds no real weight regarding minors’ refusals, and rather these cases have 
become purely outcome-based.56 It is time to challenge the legal fallacy of the ‘magic 
[18th] birthday’ and acknowledge that some children can demonstrate sufficient 
intelligence and deserve decision-making capacity before this age.57 To say that a 
competent child is vulnerable is an incoherent statement, as they must demonstrate 
high levels of intellect to attain this lucrative status.58  Additionally, to avoid this 
controversial area of law and falsely label intelligent children as incompetent, or even 
mentally impaired, is to discredit and demean minors in a way which strikes at their 
dignity and self-worth.59  
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Overruling Competent Minors: Case Closed?  
 It is evident that the law is in need of clarification. The courts continue to assert the 
fact that even competent children can be overruled when it comes to the refusal of life-
saving treatment. Although this chapter has so far focused on cases where dubious 
tactics have allowed for questionable findings of incompetence, this is not always 
possible when confronted with an unquestionably competent child. In NHS v P, such 
a case arose.60  
 The court assessed the competence of a 17-year-old girl who required ongoing 
treatment for a drug overdose in case she subsequently refused.61 Although the minor 
was deemed to satisfy the adult test under the MCA, 62  the judge stated that a 
declaration in favour of the hospital proceeding with treatment was possible through 
Lord Donaldson’s judgment within Re W. 63  Unfortunately, this case appears to 
reinforce Re W as precedent on the right to refuse–or lack of–for minors, potentially 
marking the end of the road for minors’ autonomy within this area. 
 Nevertheless, this need not be the case. NHS v P was only decided within the High 
Court, meaning that challenge of the Court of Appeal’s decision in a lower court was 
not possible, or would at least have been highly unorthodox. Additionally, the minor 
was not actively refusing at the time of the court’s decision,64  therefore this case does 
not parallel with the immediately apparent contention faced within the other refusal 
cases discussed within this chapter. Hence, despite the reaffirmation of Re W within 
this case, the lack of attention towards this issue from higher courts means that NHS v 
P by no means marks the end of the road for this area of law and cannot be seen as 
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clarifying the legal position of minors beyond doubt. These arguments shall be further 
developed within Chapter IV. Ultimately, this case does not dispel the argument that 
the current approach of the judiciary to Gillick competence and the retreat cases 
remains entirely inconsistent.65 The need for clarity has never been more apparent.  
A Need for Clarity  
 As has been demonstrated within this chapter, the case law paints an inconsistent 
picture when it comes to the assessment of Gillick competence and the application of 
the Re W principles. Generally, the courts have shied away direct engagement with Re 
W, preferring to find –at times dubious– reasons to brand the minor involved as 
incompetent in order to allow treatment to be carried out. As such, minors’ rights to 
capacity once they have proven competence when seeking to refuse medical treatment 
have been incoherently communicated within case law. It shall be argued that this 
must change to ensure that minors can be certain of their rights.  
 One possible resolution to this problem would be to unequivocally deny the right to 
refusal for even competent minors.66 This would allow for the judiciary to follow their 
paternalistic motives without using and abusing the Gillick competence test as a 
shroud for outcome-based analysis.67 This is an approach has been supported by some 
academics, as it allows for the protection of young people and prevents them from 
making mistakes which could impact their future.68 Although this appears to be the 
stance which the courts may take considering the recent decision in NHS v P, it is 
                                                 
65 ibid 88.  
66 ibid.  
67 Brazier and Bridge (n 39) 109.  
68 For example, see Jane Fortin, ‘Children’s rights- flattering to deceive?’ (2014) 26(1) Child and 
Family Law Quarterly 51, 60 and Laine Friedman Ross, ‘Arguments Against Health Care Autonomy 
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argued that this conclusion should be avoided, instead advocating for the 
empowerment of competent minors.  
 This thesis aims to challenge the appropriateness of denying competent minors the 
right to refuse treatment. Rather than labelling children as inherently vulnerable 
individuals who require protection, it would be more progressive for the courts to 
allow them the right to refuse treatment, no matter the consequence, once they have 
proven that they have competence. It has been argued already that the right to consent 
means nothing without a concurrent right of refusal.69 To allow a patient to accept 
treatment, but not reject it, flies in the face of what is required by principles of 
autonomy.70 This is a view supported by Harris, who sees the asymmetry between 
respect for competent consents and refusals as ‘palpable nonsense’.71 As such, the idea 
that the inconsistency in this area could be cured by the complete removal of a right 
to refuse medical treatment causes yet more controversy and inconsistency. To remove 
refusal as an option would leave children with no choice at all, leaving them as passive 
agents until they reach the age of majority. This would not be suitable considering pro-
patient advances regarding autonomy and human rights, as will be discussed in more 
depth within Chapter IV.  
 It is unfair to continue to treat Gillick as a ‘lesser’ form of competence,72 especially 
when the high standards required by Gillick are considered. Whereas adults enjoy the 
right to consent or to refuse if competent to decide, as well as a presumption of this 
competence, minors must prove their competence to a higher standard, yet even then 
                                                 
69 Huxtable (n 1) 84.  
70 Rachel Taylor, ‘Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health’ [2007] 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 81, 83.  
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are not guaranteed the capacity to decide.73 Due to the high bar set by Gillick, minors 
who seek to refuse treatment would not easily be deemed competent nor their decisions 
accepted on a whim. As such, concerns over the need to protect children from the harm 
which can come from refusals can be somewhat quelled under the reassurance that 
only the most intelligent and mature children could hope to satisfy Gillick’s 
requirements. When coupled with the incoherence of allowing what can be seen as a 
half-right to children, it is argued that the only logical outcome would be to respect 
the decisions of competent children. Competence should generally lead to the capacity 
to decide, no matter what decision the child chooses to make.  
 Although the correct path for this area of law is a topic likely to always split academic 
opinion, what is certain is that we need an authoritative decision from the judiciary. 
Ideally, a suitable case to truly test the judiciary regarding their competing 
commitments to paternalism and patient autonomy would arise in the near future.74 
Such a case could become the ultimate arbiter for children’s rights regarding medical 
consent law. Without a case being heard at the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court, the 
judiciary will remain bound by the questionable authorities of Re R and Re W.75 
Following chapter will aim to further examine the inconsistencies surrounding respect 
for autonomy in medical consent law between adults and minors through an 
exploration of human rights law. The outcome will show that the controversial and 
paternalistic principles within Re R and Re W are in need of urgent reconsideration. 
The best way forward would be to respect mature, intelligent minors who can 
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demonstrate competence and to allow them to make their own decisions, even if the 
judiciary see them as mistakes.76  
                                                 
76 John Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights (1986) 6(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
161, 182.  
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Chapter IV: The Future for Child Autonomy 
  In comparison to adults, children have a much higher hurdle to overcome to exercise 
autonomy regarding their own medical treatment. Not only do they have to prove their 
mental competence, but the Gillick test has been shown to require a far deeper notion 
of understanding regarding the medical procedure involved than under the MCA.1 
Despite this, judges have still shown reluctance to grant competence and subsequent 
capacity to intelligent and mature minors seeking to refuse medical treatment. 2  
Although the Re R and Re W cases legally permit the override of a competent minor’s 
refusal of treatment,3 it has nevertheless been demonstrated that the judiciary has 
developed a dubious tendency to label intelligent minors as incompetent based on 
tokenistic, or even non-existent, examinations of competence.4 Consequently, minors’ 
abilities are being undermined by this lack of engagement with their competence, as 
well as limiting their legal rights to autonomy.  
 This chapter will aim to question the continuation of this judicial approach. This thesis 
shall suggest that Lord Donaldson’s judgments in the retreat cases are now legally 
questionable based not only on the issues explore within Chapter II, but on broader 
progress in recent years in terms of human rights and autonomy. It will demonstrate 
that the current lacuna in progress for children’s rights in this area of law is no longer 
appropriate, and that the legal principles affecting mature minors’ autonomy rights 
require modernisation. Respect for human rights and autonomy has progressed rapidly 
                                                 
1 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (Third Edition, Routledge 2015) 119; Gillick v 
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in the two decades since the conclusion of the retreat cases.5 Evidence to support this 
shift shall be drawn from legislative and common law developments, as well as 
international influences such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. These sources suggest a general 
legal retreat away from overriding paternalism in favour of priority for individual 
autonomy.6 This chapter shall conclude by suggesting that it is time that we stop 
underestimating and demeaning children with preconceived notions of incompetence 
and vulnerability. Instead, we should be embracing their status as rights holders and 
individuals capable of making their own decisions, even if adults view them as 
mistakes, upon satisfaction of the Gillick test.7  
The Increased Prominence of Human Rights and the Road to Autonomy Since 
Re R 
 A lot has changed since the early 1990s. The United Kingdom has experienced a 
change in the foundation of the law, placing human rights firmly at the centre of 
judicial consideration.8 Re R and Re W were decided in the infant years of the UK’s 
ratification of the UNCRC and preceded the domestic incorporation of the ECHR 
through the HRA. It is argued that these documents have altered the legal landscape 
so fundamentally that the pre-HRA authorities on the refusal of medical treatment by 
minors are in need of urgent reassessment.9  
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6 Lynn Hagger, The Child as Vulnerable Patient: Protection and Empowerment (Ashgate 2009) 15.  
7 John Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence of Children’s Rights (1986) 6(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
161, 182.  
8 Jane Fortin, ‘Rights brought home for children’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 350, 351.  
9 Emma Cave, Young People Who Refuse Life Sustaining Treatment (Nuffield Foundation, University 
of Leeds 2011-2013) 3.  
54 
 
The UN Convention of the Rights of the Child 
 The Re R and W litigations were heard very shortly after the ratification of the 
UNCRC by the United Kingdom.10 As such, the Convention’s impact on domestic law 
had not yet been realised. It shall be argued that the UNCRC’s inclusion of not only 
protective rights, but participatory rights for children can provide grounds upon which 
to question the principles within Re R and Re W in favour of higher regard for 
competence and autonomy. The CRC for the first time created an international 
Convention specifically designed to further the needs and rights of children as a unique 
and individual group. It recognised the status of children as rights holders.11 This in 
itself was a great step forward for the empowerment of children as individuals with 
‘their own identities’, rather than objects of adult control and protection. 12 
Nevertheless, adults, including the judiciary, are reluctant to give up their power over 
children.13 Although protective measures have been embraced domestically, there is a 
continued resistance to the empowerment of children.14 This is evidenced within the 
refusal cases, as well as the continued application, or at least the lack of condemnation, 
of the retreat cases. It is argued that by favouring paternalism and protection, 
effectively ignoring meaningful participatory rights in the field of adolescent refusals, 
the UK could be seen to be in breach of its international obligations under this 
Convention.  
                                                 
10 The UNCRC was signed by the United Kingdom in 1990, ratified in 1991 and came into force in 
1992.  
11 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment 4: Adolescent health and 
development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2003) UN Doc 
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 The most important provision for children’s autonomy comes within Article 12 CRC. 
The Article reads: 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right 
to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being 
given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. (emphasis added)15 
 This article enshrines the dual motives of the Convention not only to protect children, 
but to empower them.16 Within General Comment 12, the Committee of the Rights of 
the Child stated that participatory rights are of ‘fundamental’ value to the 
Convention.17 The Committee also emphasised the role of evolving capabilities, which 
encompasses the fact that minors do not attain intellectual maturity at a certain age, 
but develop more gradually, regarding the weight to be attributed to Article 12 rights.18 
Gillick, despite being decided prior to the UK’s ratification of the CRC,  serves as an 
example of a test which incorporates this concept into domestic law.19 It relies not on 
age as an indicator of ability to attain competence, but the child’s maturity and 
intelligence.20 Despite this potential within the law for the empowerment of competent 
minors, the retreat cases placed limits on a competent child’s ability to refuse.21 
Consequently, as was proven within the previous chapter, the judiciary have been 
reluctant to truly embrace the empowerment of mature minors, struggling to release 
competent children from their protective wing.22  
                                                 
15 UNCRC, Article 12(1) (emphasis added).  
16 Michael Freeman, ‘The Future of Children’s Rights’ (2000) 14 Children and Society 277, 277.  
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 Although children’s views are often heard within court cases, this involvement is 
often more ‘tokenistic’ than empowering.23 For example, the children’s views were 
heard and discussed within Re M.24 However, such views have never been allowed to 
have determinative impact within refusal cases. As Laura Lundy has eloquently 
argued, the rights within Article 12 are meaningless unless children not only have a 
voice, but can communicate their opinions in a way which can lead to actual impact 
and recognition.25  This view is echoed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, 
which stated that merely listening to the child is insufficient; once a child has 
demonstrated their competence to understand a situation, they must be granted greater 
responsibility for their decisions.26 States have an obligation to assess the competence 
of children before denying them meaningful participation in their decision.27 This is 
something which has been neglected by the judiciary either through merely tokenistic 
examination, or even ignorance, of the Gillick competence test in refusal cases.28 As 
such, the current law may well be incompatible with international obligations on this 
basis.  
 The Gillick test, although by no means a perfect test, does focus upon evolving 
competence for minors, rather than age-based standards and over-bearing paternalism. 
As such, it is suggested that should the retreat cases be removed, Gillick could secure 
the empowerment intended for them by this pioneering Convention.29  This thesis 
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argues that the prominence and continued application of the retreat cases, as well as 
the manipulation and lack of application of the Gillick test in refusal cases, require 
urgent reconsideration and condemnation respectively. Due to the ever-increasing 
prominence of the CRC and its strengthening of participatory rights, the law must be 
updated in order to eradicate contradiction with the Convention’s principles. 
Accordingly, it is time that the paternalistic standards derived from Re R and Re W 
were reassessed and the authorities themselves overruled.  
The Human Rights Act 1998 
 Another key development since Re R and W was the incorporation of the ECHR into 
domestic law through the enactment of the HRA 1998.  As a result, judges must 
interpret legislation in a rights-compatible manner and must also apply Convention 
rights within their daily judicial duties due to their status as a public authority.30 As 
such, human rights principles now permeate the law in a more considerable way than 
was the case when Lord Donaldson made his judgments within the retreat cases. It has 
been emphasised that children have just as much entitlement to the rights contained 
within the ECHR as their adult counterparts, with Article 8 being of particular 
importance to minors.31 As such, children are rights holders in need of empowerment, 
rather than passive objects to be protected by the judiciary.32 In relation to consent 
law, this could have substantial impact should Re R and Re W be reconsidered. Should 
a refusal case be heard today, it would be almost ‘inconceivable’ for the courts to 
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ignore the weight to be granted to the rights of patients under Article 8 ECHR due to 
their duties under the HRA.33  
 This has proven somewhat true, as the 2014 case of NHS v P incorporated Convention 
rights into its decision.34 Nevertheless, although P was seen to have competence, she 
was still denied determinative capacity based on the Re W judgment. Baker J even 
states that he has ‘no hesitation’ in authorising the treatment. He does mention that the 
minor’s Article 8 rights under the Convention were relevant, however quickly 
discredits the right’s weight due to its qualified nature, as well as the competing 
balance from the right to life under Article 2. As such, even with the influence of the 
ECHR, it appears that minors’ autonomy rights are still being denied by the judiciary. 
Nevertheless, despite the hindrance this case appears to present to the potential impact 
of human rights law on minors’ refusal rights, this thesis challenges its significance as 
a barrier to progress. In other words, this case need not mark the end of the road for 
minors’ autonomy rights.  
 Firstly, NHS v P was heard in the High Court, whereas Re W was heard in the superior 
Court of Appeal. 35  Consequently, Baker J was bound to apply the logic of this 
judicially superior, albeit antiquated, case. Even if this logic fails, the NHS v P case 
presented a much less controversial decision to the judge as it first appears. The minor 
in question had already given her consent to begin treatment for her overdose.36 The 
judge was making a pre-emptive decision as to whether the doctors may continue the 
treatment if the girl subsequently refused the following required doses.37 Thus, it is 
arguable that a truly hard case in this area, one where the child is vehemently refusing 
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all treatment and fully satisfies the Gillick test at the time of judgment is yet to be seen. 
When the change in judicial attitude both internationally and domestically –which 
shall be explored in depth below– is considered, NHS v P may not be indicative of the 
potential approach of the judiciary more broadly towards the weight to be given to 
Article 8 rights for refusing minors. As such, it is arguable that if a true refusal case 
came before the Court of Appeal, or indeed the Supreme Court, the judiciary may be 
more inclined to give proper weight to minors’ Article 8 rights, as well as the 
fundamental right of self-determination for competent individuals.  
 With regards to adults’ rights under Article 8, Pretty v United Kingdom proved that 
medical law ought to give great weight to individual autonomy.38 Here, it was stated 
that Article 8 unequivocally contains a right to self-determination.39 Although the 
interference with the applicant’s rights was found to be justified under Article 8(2), 
this case demonstrates an increased commitment to adult autonomy within the human 
rights and medical spheres.40 There is also evidence of increased respect for autonomy 
domestically within some aspects of the Nicklinson judgment.41 Here, a majority of 
the Supreme Court held that it would be possible to deem the law criminalising 
assisted suicide to be incompatible with Article 8 ECHR.42 Despite the fact that a 
declaration was not made, this case demonstrates that the autonomy given to 
competent individuals is of the upmost importance to the highest court within the 
United Kingdom. The reason the judiciary were concerned about making any 
meaningful alteration to the law was that it would have interfered with Parliamentary 
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matters, as the issue was at the time under consideration by the Houses in the form of 
a Bill.43 Therefore, as the issue is no longer active within Parliament, this judgment 
hints that the likely priority would go to Article 8 rights regarding end of life decisions 
if a similar case arose in the future.44 Even when considering controversial life and 
death issues, the judiciary continue to emphasise the importance of self-determination. 
As such, it is argued that a similar priority for autonomy be applied in cases of refusal 
involving minors, which, as previous chapters evidence, is currently lacking greatly. 
After all, children have been explicitly accepted as being entitled to the same 
Convention rights as adults, with Article 8 being identified as amongst the most 
relevant for minors.45  
 The emphasis of both domestic and international bodies on the priority to be granted 
to personal autonomy for competent individuals demonstrates the archaic nature of the 
overwhelming paternalism supported in the retreat and refusal cases. Jurisprudence on 
the ECHR’s fundamental right of self-determination has prompted a shift in judicial 
attitude towards the status of children as rights holders. The judiciary have 
demonstrated an increasing tendency to refer to children’s rights to participation in 
matters concerning them, rather than taking a purely welfare-based approach. Hence, 
this provides further evidence for the potential overrule of the retreat cases, and the 
embrace of competent minors’ rights to autonomy.  
 Firstly, in Mabon v Mabon Thorpe LJ showed a commitment to ensuring the 
fulfilment of international human rights obligations relating to children’s participation 
in court proceedings concerning their daily lives.46 This case involved children aged 
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17, 15 and 13 arguing for their right to choose who represented them in family 
proceedings. Their appeal was granted, and the court’s reasoning for their success 
focused heavily on the ‘keener appreciation of the autonomy of the child and the 
child's consequential right to participate’ evident in the 21st century.47 Citing Article 
12 CRC and Article 8 ECHR, Mabon urged judges to ensure that their focus is on the 
understanding on the minor involved.  Thorpe LJ went so far as to say that where 
‘articulate teenagers’ are concerned, the right to participation ‘outweighs’ paternalism 
and welfare concerns.48 Consequently, Thorpe LJ’s dicta can be seen to evidence a 
shift in judicial opinion away from inherently paternalistic motivations towards the 
protection of autonomy rights where a child has proven that they deserve such 
responsibility over their own decisions.  
 Secondly, R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health provided further evidence of a 
judicial shift towards the primacy of autonomy.49  Here, the decision in Gillick was 
affirmed as ‘good law’ post-HRA, and a similar thread of children’s rights and 
autonomy dominated the judgement.50 Drawing upon the dicta of Thorpe LJ as well 
as the aforementioned international human rights instruments, Silber J stated that any 
subsequent retreat from Gillick would be ‘wrong’ in light of the ‘general movement’ 
towards supporting and respecting children’s rights to autonomy over their futures.51 
This once more suggests that the sort of retreat seen within Re R and Re W is currently 
frowned upon within judicial dicta and that the courts are, in light of human rights 
progress, inclined to favour empowerment over protection for mature, competent 
minors.  
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 The reasoning within these two post-HRA cases is vehemently opposed to the 
paternalistic, welfare-focused reasoning evident within the refusal and retreat cases. 
Respect for autonomy has been continually denied for mature minors in favour of 
paternalism, justified by Re R and W. Nevertheless, the reasoning in Mabon and Axon 
could provide a welcome modernisation in the law.52 They show an emphasis on the 
importance of participation and autonomy, even when faced with welfare concerns, 
which starkly contrasts that seen within the refusal cases explored in the previous 
chapter. Following the dicta in these more modern cases, as well as the general shift 
of judicial and legal attitude towards autonomy and children’s rights, it appears 
possible that if a suitable refusal case was heard by the Court of Appeal or Supreme 
Court today, the pendulum would finally and definitively swing away from intrusive 
paternalism regarding competent minors.  
Nevertheless, despite the continuing prominence of autonomy and paternalism falling 
‘out of favour’ as a result,53 Re R and Re W remain leading authorities regarding 
minors’ refusals of medical treatment. Progress in this morally difficult area appears 
to be stunted as reluctance to allow competent children to make life-changing 
decisions endures. This attitude is arguably inappropriate and outdated when the 
UNCRC, HRA and judicial shifts in favour of child autonomy are considered. This 
chapter shall go on to scrutinise why the judiciary, and the political branches, are so 
reluctant to grant the same autonomy to competent minors as is given to adults. It aims 
to dispel some of the fears about recognising the fundamental right to self-
                                                 
52 Rachel Taylor, ‘Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health’ [2007] 
Child and Family Law Quarterly 81, 94.  
53 Hagger (n 6) 46.  
63 
 
determination to such children and suggests that the time is ripe for meaningful 
progress to be made for minors wishing to refuse medical treatment.    
Children and the Refusal of Medical Treatment: A Lack of Progress for 
Autonomy 
 Despite the progress made generally in increasing the prominence of human rights 
and autonomy, it appears that there is still some reluctance in letting go of the 
paternalistic paradigm when it comes to competent minors.54 In 2014, as mentioned 
previously,  An NHS Foundation Hospital v P unfortunately demonstrated that despite 
the progress examined within this chapter for autonomy in general, even for the 
increased recognition of children’s rights shown in Axon and Mabon, there remains a 
lacunae in progress for children’s rights and autonomy within the field of medical 
refusals.55 Some of the reasons behind this continued reluctance shall be examined in 
an attempt to dispel fears about granting competent children determinative capacity.  
 It is a natural instinct to seek to protect children. Society has labelled children as ‘cute, 
lovable creatures, but above all, weak, vulnerable and dependent’ according to 
Archard, leading to a tendency to view them as objects in need of protection rather 
than individuals and rights holders deserving of empowerment.56 There is a strong 
paradigm that minors are less intellectually able than those over the age of majority, 
warranting less weight to be given to their decisions and a more protective stance by 
the judiciary. 57  This presumption has infiltrated the core of medical consent law 
regarding children, evidenced most obviously within the Re R and Re W judgments. 
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Critics of autonomy rights for children such as Lainie Friedman Ross have expressed 
the view that children lack the life experience to make life-changing decisions about 
issues such as medical treatment.58 She feels that they lack the competence to make 
such decisions, as they cannot draw from past experience to judge the outcome or the 
likely effects of refusal. Such beliefs about children’s competence have led to the 
reluctance to grant autonomy even to mature minors evidenced within the case law. 
Nevertheless, this view is somewhat narrow minded towards children’s abilities. 
 Lynn Hagger is a strong advocate for children’s rights to autonomy and respect.59 She 
has emphasised the fact that children have mental abilities far beyond those we 
accredit them with.60 Although it is accepted that not all children will have the same 
mental abilities as adults, of course very young children will lack the independence 
adults can be expected to have and some children are indeed immature, Ross’s view 
appears to connect experience purely to age. This thesis argues that this is an unduly 
restrictive view, and is not always conducive to reality.61 Children, especially those 
with chronic or recurrent conditions, may be very ‘experienced patients’ with a deep 
knowledge and understanding of medical matters.62 Such minors would know far more 
than the average adult and their competence regarding related matters would be far 
more difficult to deny than an individual who had never set foot inside a hospital. 
Consequently, Ross’s argument that children invariably lack competence and 
therefore should never be granted capacity to refuse treatment becomes somewhat 
unconvincing. UNICEF have echoed this concern, warning against the application of 
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‘blanket assumptions’ regarding children.63 Experience is something accrued without 
discrimination of age, and to assume that minors lack the ability to make such 
decisions is to ignore plain evidence to the contrary.64  Such attitudes also fail to 
account for the concept of evolving capabilities, which has been shown to be central 
to the CRC’s principle of empowerment. 65  Consequently, the argument that all 
children should be prevented from refusing treatment due to a lack of experience or 
ability is a fallacy based on sweeping generalisations, and is less than persuasive. 
 Another justification for the lack of progress for competent minor’s autonomy lies in 
the weight to be granted to parental rights. The ECHR has been seen to encompass 
children’s interests. However, many rights, including Article 8 under paragraph 2, 
allow for interferences to be justified with reference to the rights of others. Supporters 
of paternalism argue that parents are fundamental to a child’s creation of important 
familial relationships and general development, and as such children’s rights ought to 
be tempered with parental approval.66 Support for this argument has been apparently 
evidenced even within the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence in Nielsen 
v Denmark.67 Here, a child of 12 kept against his will on a psychiatric ward through 
his mother’s choice failed to show his Article 5 right to liberty had been engaged, let 
alone breached.68 The Strasbourg court held that at this age it is normal for a parent to 
be the one to make such decisions on their child’s behalf.69 The lack of weight given 
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to the child’s rights and wishes in this case lends support the arguments that parental 
input and override powers are legitimate despite the HRA.70   
 Nevertheless, the arguments from parental rights are far from water-tight. As explored 
above, the ECHR provides rights to both adults and children alike without 
discrimination.71 As such, to presumptively favour the rights of parents over the rights 
of children is contrary to the intentions of the Convention and demeans the status of 
children as rights holders.72 In addition, Nielsen is a dubious authority decided over 
two decades ago. 73  The Convention is described as a ‘living instrument’ which 
develops along with social changes and progress.74 As such, evidence examined in the 
previous section hold strong weight in suggesting that the Strasbourg court may view 
children’s rights in a more favourable light if a case regarding a minor’s autonomy 
were heard today.75 Furthermore, within the Nielsen judgement itself it was alluded 
that had the child been older, his mother’s interference would not have been justifiable 
and the boy’s decision should have had much more gravity.76  
 In addition, Gillick itself professed that parental rights terminate upon their child 
achieving competence.77  It is also important to note, as Ian Kennedy has asserted in 
light of the tragic litigation regarding Charlie Gard, parents have not rights, but duties 
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regarding their children in the context of medical treatment.78 In other words, parents 
must act within the child’s best interests, and have no right to intervene with their 
child’s decisions simply due to disagreement. As such, it is argued that once a minor 
has proven competence, which in itself is an incredibly difficult task, then the child 
should be seen to be able to determine their own best interests. The parents are no 
longer needed to step in and protect their child, as competence proves an ability to 
think independently with intelligence and understanding. To allow interference with a 
competently made decision is to impose standards of objective rationality on minors, 
meaning that they could not decide unless it is what the courts, or parents deem to be 
the ‘correct’ decision.79 Even Friedman Ross, a strong proponent of near-unrestricted 
parental rights, agrees that only accepting a decision if the adults involved agree with 
it makes a ‘farce’ of true autonomy.80 As such, arguments which allude to parental 
rights as superior to that of competent children’s autonomy rights carry much less 
weight than they are often accredited with.  
 As such, this chapter has aimed to demonstrate that Re R and Re W become even more 
tenuous authorities when subjected to rights-based scrutiny. The idea that a child’s 
rights have no certainty in their legal weight, or even existence, can be seen to 
insufficiently address the United Kingdom’s international obligations. 81 
Consequently, the continued denial of autonomy for competent minors cannot 
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continue to be based on arguments from parental authority, as developments both 
domestically and internationally contradict this conclusion. 
 Perhaps the most forceful argument driving the judiciary’s reluctance to grant 
children determinative capacity comes from a strong moral pull against allowing 
children to refuse potentially life-saving treatment.82 Even academics such as Jane 
Fortin, who are otherwise strong supporters of children’s rights and autonomy, 
struggle to accept that minors may have the right to refuse treatment knowing that this 
will lead to serious harm or even death.83 It is an uncomfortable thought, to ask a judge 
to support the death or pain of a child even if that child is mature and competently 
chooses this path for themselves. Because of this discomfort, judges have disregarded 
the wishes of mature minors, replacing respect for autonomy with artificial findings 
of incompetence to shroud their paternalistic motives for overriding refusals.84  
  The judiciary feel a very strong obligation to ensure that children attain the age of 
majority.85 Upon turning 18, a person obtains almost unrestricted autonomy to refuse 
treatment without question as to their motives or rationality.86 Judges have justified 
the continued validity of the approach in Re W with reference to their obligation to 
ensure a minor survives to be granted these rights and decide for themselves.87 In other 
words, they appear to reject the ability of competent minors to refuse, so that they may 
preserve their future autonomy.88  
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 This is a view also shared by Friedman Ross, who promotes the idea that recognising 
children’s autonomy rights would ignore their long-term interests and ability to 
exercise autonomy in later life.89  As such, she is ‘unwilling’ to accept decisions by 
minors which would be regarded as unsavoury, even if they are competent, as the long-
term interests of the child require protection even if at the expense of what she calls 
‘short-term autonomy’.90 She does not feel that the achievement of competence is 
enough to warrant respect for minors’ autonomy; children, in her view, must be 
thought of as developing persons, undeserving of full autonomous respect until they 
reach adulthood.91 The idea of protecting even competent children by restricting their 
autonomy is a popular one amongst those who support Re W and Re R. However, this 
thesis takes the opinion that their logic may be flawed. Although a noble and admirable 
motive, to protect children from death and harm, the methods employed by the 
judiciary which have prevented mature minors exercising autonomy ought to be 
questioned. 92  It shall be demonstrated that competent minors are not fragile, 
vulnerable creatures, but rather intelligent individuals deserving of respect, whatever 
the consequence.  
 Gillick requires understanding far beyond that required within the MCA. For example, 
in Re E the child was expected to not only understand the broad consequence of his 
refusal, but the concept and finality of death along with the agonising nature of this 
demise.93 This is an incredibly deep level of understanding most adults would fail to 
satisfy.94 Yet, upon attaining this incredibly high standard, minors are not granted the 
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same freedom as competent adults due to the prominence of paternalism within the 
retreat cases. As such, the judiciary currently heavily underestimate children, 
infantilising them to justify paternalistic instincts in refusal cases.95 As the threshold 
in Gillick is so high, and has been interpreted to be even higher within certain refusal 
cases,96 it is logical that if a child satisfies this test they cannot validly be labelled as 
vulnerable, and have instead earnt the right to respect for their autonomous decision.97 
The status of competence ought to mean something, and we ought to respect 
competent decisions by minors in the same way as adults.98  
 The future autonomy arguments are also fragile when the age of majority itself is 
examined. The age of 18 brings with it no magical force. It is most likely that a child 
of 17 and a half years and one of 18 are entirely similar in their cognitive abilities, 
beliefs and understanding. 99  Yet, the law grants the latter the freedom to decide 
autonomously what medical treatment their body shall be subject to, and denies the 
former any such right. This concept of competence is entirely false. For example, the 
minor in Re E was forced to endure years of blood transfusions, leaving him feeling 
as though he had betrayed his faith and his God.  As explained within Chapter II, just 
three years later upon turning 18, the boy was allowed to refuse the continuation of 
his treatment and died.100 His beliefs and understandings of his situation had not 
changed. Nevertheless, due to the paternalistic actions of the judiciary based on their 
conceptions of his future autonomy, E died feeling ‘violated’. 101  Even more 
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demeaning is the fact that many arguably competent children have endured being 
wrongly perceived to be mentally inferior to meet the judiciary’s paternalistic 
drives.102  
 The arguments from ‘future autonomy’ fail to account for the staggering impact 
forced treatment can have on the patients involved. Invasion of a person’s bodily 
integrity should not be justified with reference to the fact that they might one day 
change their mind, or regret that decision.103 If this logic were applied more broadly, 
no one would ever be able to make a drastic life decision. The conception that judges 
know what is best for a child’s future goals and should deny autonomy on this basis is 
therefore misguided and unfair to competent children.104 In refusing to acknowledge 
that children can have the same intellectual abilities as adults, we continue to demean 
and infantilise them unnecessarily. When such affronts to the dignity of the children 
involved are concerned, denying competent minors the capacity to refuse becomes 
harder to support.  
 As has been demonstrated, the reluctance to engage with children’s autonomy rights 
to refuse medical treatment has been backed by questionable logic. It has been shown 
that arguments centred around the vulnerability of children are largely ill-founded 
when applied to mature, competent minors. As such, the judiciary’s general lack of 
engagement with capacity for competent minors can no longer be justified. It is time 
that mature minors were given the rights they deserve having proven their competence, 
even if this could lead to difficult outcomes.  
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The Way Forward: Respecting Competent Minors   
 The reluctance on behalf of the judiciary and the political branches to grant minors 
the ability to refuse treatment is understandable. Often, the cases discussed by this 
thesis involve a child facing life-or-death circumstances. This is an undeniably 
difficult issue, and strikes at the sensitivity of protective and paternal instincts 
regarding children.105 It is far easier for judges to find minors incompetent, rather than 
to acknowledge their paternalistic agendas and explicitly override a mature minor’s 
competently made decision. In turn this has led to a plethora of bad law in this area, 
and the unwarranted infantilisation of mature minors. This chapter has aimed to 
demonstrate that this approach cannot continue. Not only do the dubious findings of 
incompetence within refusal cases demean children, the lack of embrace for children’s 
competence and subsequent capacity is very arguably incompatible with the UK’s 
human rights obligations.  
 The following chapter shall examine the potential routes available for reform of this 
area of law, as well their likelihood of becoming reality. Despite support for children’s 
rights within the law both domestically and internationally, there remains resistance 
to embracing minors’ rights within this area. Children are struggling to ‘redefine 
themselves as competent beings’ as Katherine Hunt Federle has described it.106 As 
such, Chapter V shall not only address the potential for legal reform, but the need for 
social changes regarding how we perceive children.  
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Chapter V: Protecting the Vulnerable and Empowering the 
Capable: Thoughts on How to Change the Law 
 
 This chapter aims to suggest ways in which the law could be altered in order to bring 
this area of law in line with human rights obligations and general principles of 
autonomy. It has been concluded that the law cannot remain in its current state of 
uncertainty. Equally, it has been concluded that to eradicate minors’ rights to refuse 
entirely would be inappropriate and illogical. As such, the question to address here is 
how those who are able to make a difference should go about clarifying minor’s rights 
to refuse life-saving medical treatment. This chapter shall explore the likelihood and 
suitability of judicial and parliamentary methods of altering the existing law. The 
potential extension of the adult test, the MCA, to patients of all ages will also be 
assessed. It shall be argued that although some aspects of this statutory regime could 
be beneficial if applied to minors, the full extension of the MCA to under 16s would 
not be the best reform option. Ultimately, it shall be suggested that although change 
and reinforcement would be required at law in order to formally support the rights of 
minors with competence, what we may require before such reform can succeed is 
further social challenge to the current dichotomy between childhood and adulthood. 
Only once society accepts that children can be just as capable of making independent 
decisions as those over the age of majority can we fully expect legal changes to have 
real impact on patients.1 It is suggested that the judiciary could play their part in 
reinforcing and encouraging this social change through incremental reform.  
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Judicial Change 
 The first and most obvious method of change for this area would be to allow the 
judiciary to remedy the confusion left by its own methods through the common law. 
The Gillick test was a product of judicial creation, as was the unfortunate retreat from 
Gillick. As such, it would make sense for the judiciary to be the ones to further develop 
and update the law surrounding minors’ refusal rights. But how should the courts go 
about such a task? And how likely are the judiciary to uphold the rights of minors if a 
suitable case was to arise?  
 As mentioned within Chapter II, it is certainly arguable that Lord Donaldson’s dicta 
within Re W remains just that, obiter dicta, due to the uncertainty around W’s 
competence.2 As such, subsequent courts would not be bound to follow his judgment 
regarding the strength and weight allotted to a refusal made with Gillick competence. 
In this sense, it may be as simple as to state that Lord Donaldson’s limitations on 
granting capacity to competent minors are no longer applicable. If the judiciary were 
to embrace this option, this should ensure that a lack of competence would be the only 
justification for paternalistic interventions where a minor refuses treatment. This 
option would remove barriers to the acceptance of Gillick’s liberal nature, terminating 
powers to override a decision made with competence to both consent and refuse.3 This 
would ensure that the concepts of evolving competencies and individual autonomy 
were firmly at the forefront of this area of law in a way which the retreat cases 
currently prevent. Nevertheless, this is perhaps a little optimistic. To do so would be 
to eradicate 20 years of Lord Donaldson’s judgment being treated as binding by the 
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judiciary. Such long-standing commitment to the retreat cases is unlikely to be thrown 
away quite so flippantly. In fact, the judgment has had direct application as recently 
as 2014.4 As such, a more nuanced approach may be necessary.  
 Another way in which the judiciary could alter the existing law without desecrating 
the long-standing retreat cases quite so aggressively would be to adjust the law through 
the HRA. As this piece of ground-breaking legislation was not enacted until after the 
conclusion of Re R and Re W, it is possible that should a suitable case arise, the 
common law could be altered and developed in a more rights-oriented manner through 
the court’s powers and obligations granted within the HRA. This is especially poignant 
as an option for reform when the damning nature of right-based scrutiny in this area 
of law seen within Chapter IV is considered.  
 The HRA could assist reform through various sections. Firstly, the courts have the 
interpretive obligation under section 3 HRA at their disposal. This section requires the 
judiciary to develop the law compatibly with the ECHR when deciding cases which 
engage Convention rights. In this sense, a case involving a minor vehemently refusing 
life-saving treatment would engage the right to private life under Article 8, which has 
been determined to include the right to autonomy.5 The Convention has as much 
applicability to children as to adults, 6  as discussed within the previous chapter. 
Additionally, Article 14 prohibits discrimination when applying Convention rights, 
which would include discriminatory treatment based on age. As the retreat cases 
precede the HRA, it would be necessary to consider the rights under the ECHR when 
deciding a refusal case. The articles mentioned would lend the courts the scope they 
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would need to adjust the common law and allow for minors to refuse treatment once 
they can prove competence. As mentioned within Chapter IV, the current common 
law is very arguably incompatible with these rights and therefore would fall within the 
scope of the section 3 obligation.7 Similarly, the courts are bound to act compatibly 
with the convention due to their status as a public authority under section 6(3)(a) HRA, 
opening another avenue for change via the judiciary.8 In these ways, the courts could 
intertwine Gillick with Article 8 rights in order to ensure that protection for minors’ 
autonomy becomes the focal point of medical consent law not only for adults, but for 
all. 
 The HRA could hence be used to de facto overrule, or at least adjust the paternalistic 
force of, the retreat cases through rights-based reinterpretation. Although it has been 
suggested by Pattinson that the provisions within the HRA should allow even the lower 
courts to depart from precedent where incompatibility with the ECHR arises, this path 
has yet to be embraced by the courts themselves.9 As such, the task of reform is more 
likely to succeed if left to the higher courts. Through reinterpretation of the retreat 
cases, the courts could amend the common law and give the same weight to refusals 
made with competence as is seen for consent. Using these methods, the higher courts 
could use a subsequent, suitable mature minor’s refusal as a catalyst for real change 
within the law. Such a case could ensure that autonomy, rather than paternalism, 
becomes the dominant principle of minors’ medical consent law. In other words, the 
law could finally eradicate the unsustainable asymmetry between capable minors’ 
consent and refusals, bringing the law for adults and minors together more cohesively.  
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 Nevertheless, even if the HRA is not engaged, the common law itself can provide a 
means for reform. Sir James Munby professes that the common law has a ‘remarkable 
ability to adapt in dramatic ways’ to changing tides.10 It has often allowed for the 
evolution of law in order to keep up with general shifts in society’s opinions on issues 
such as autonomy rights. One example within the context of adults can be seen in the 
caesarean section litigations.11 For adults, competence means an ‘absolute right to 
choose’ whether to consent or refuse treatment regardless of the decision’s rationality 
or consequence.12 However, in the early 1990s, Lord Donaldson suggested that the 
right of a competent adult to refuse may be compromised where the life of an unborn 
baby is also at risk.13 As a result of this dicta, subsequent cases deprived otherwise 
arguably legally competent women of their freedom of choice, a right which was so 
vehemently defended within the same paragraph of the judgment.14  
 However, over time the judiciary swung their favour from paternalistic intervention 
based on the protection of mother and child to one focused on the fundamental right 
of self-determination owed to all with the competence to make decisions for 
themselves. This view was evidenced in Re MB by Butler Sloss LJ, who emphasised 
that an adult with competence, even if pregnant, had the absolute right to refuse 
treatment regardless of the consequences. 15  This position was confirmed in St 
George’s Heathcare NHS Trust v S, bringing an end to Lord Donaldson’s autonomy-
limiting dicta five years after its introduction.16  As such, although no case has yet 
                                                 
10 Sir James Munby, ‘Protecting the Rights of Vulnerable and Incapacitous Adults- The Role of the 
Courts: An Example of Judicial Law Making’ (2014) 26(1) Child and Family Law Quarterly 64, 77.  
11 Rebecca Bailey-Harris, ‘Pregnancy, autonomy and the refusal of medical treatment’ (1998) 114 
Law Quarterly Review 550.  
12 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1993] Fam 95, 102 (Lord Donaldson).  
13 ibid.  
14 Re S (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam 123.  
15 Re MB (Refusal of Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426.  
16 [1998] 3 WLR 936, 950.  
78 
 
been heard where a competent woman’s refusal of a caesarean section has been 
unequivocally accepted, this line of cases demonstrates the ability of the common law 
to develop with time. Consequently, the same logic can, and should, be applied to 
competent, mature minors seeking to refuse life-changing medical treatment.  
 In fact, the solution to the judiciary’s misuse of Gillick may be less ground-breaking 
than first thought. This is because the solution may in fact already exist in the form of 
the court’s inherent jurisdiction. This power has been subject to judicial development 
in recent times due to its extension regarding ‘vulnerable adults’ who nonetheless have 
competence under the relevant tests.17 Originally, the inherent jurisdiction had no 
place where an adult was seen to satisfy the test for competence.18 However, this 
proved troublesome for some vulnerable adults. The MCA test can, at times, leave 
individuals who cannot truly make an autonomous decision with the status of 
competence and therefore legal capacity.19 Herring states that the MCA does not allow 
for assessment of the genuineness of personal beliefs which underpin the patient’s 
decision. 20  Consequently, some may be granted capacity without full requisite 
competence, encompassing mental abilities as well as free and autonomous thought. 
For example, the inherent jurisdiction has been applied to adults who were competent 
under the relevant tests, yet had proven unable to make their own autonomous decision 
as a result of strong familial influence and even abusive coercion.21 Such adults are 
sound of mind, suffering no impairment or disturbance of the mind or brain. 22 
Nevertheless, factors which go beyond the MCA’s requirements may still influence 
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such individuals’ abilities to act in a truly autonomous manner.23 It would be damaging 
and potentially dangerous to grant capacity to a patient incapable of autonomous 
thought.24 Such an individual, lacking in independent thought and conscience, would 
not be competent enough to truly assess their situation and make the right decision 
regarding their own interests. To remove protection from such a patient would be an 
injustice in itself, leaving them vulnerable to harm. Consequently, the inherent 
jurisdiction has developed as a ‘safety net’ of sorts for vulnerable adults, granting 
those without true autonomy the protection they require whilst ensuring that well-
rounded competence and freedom of choice remain the focal points of capacity law.  
 In terms of this power’s application to minors, nothing is required in the way of 
expanding the scope of the inherent jurisdiction. The courts already have an unlimited 
reach when it comes minors. As such, if the judiciary were to overrule the retreat cases 
and allow competent minors the same rights to consent and refuse treatment as are 
currently allotted to capable adults, it would not shut the door to protection. The 
inherent jurisdiction could act as a similar safety net for those minors who may satisfy 
the legal tests, but are nonetheless affected by undue influence or other extraneous 
factors which may impede their ability to make a truly autonomous decision. This 
would ensure that competent minors would be granted capacity, but only if their 
competence encompassed autonomous capabilities. Hence, the judiciary would still be 
able to prevent those who lack autonomy from making decisions they ought not to be 
in control of.  
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 Rather than misusing, ignoring, or manipulating the Gillick test, the inherent 
jurisdiction could be used to allow the judiciary to embrace competent minors’ 
capacity. This power could offer a more limited form of paternalistic intervention than 
is currently permitted through the retreat cases. The retreat cases allow for intervention 
with a competent decision if the courts feel it would be the best decision for that child. 
As has been seen, this often means that intervention occurs due to the judiciary’s 
disagreement with the child’s decision. Conversely, the inherent jurisdiction’s use 
within competent adults’ cases has been limited to those who can be seen to lack 
autonomous thought in some form. Whilst ensuring that the law would be focused on 
the child’s competence, the inherent jurisdiction would allow a degree of ‘flexibility’ 
for the judiciary where the competent child lacks full autonomy.25 This flexibility 
ensures that the attainment of competence by minors would remain of primary 
importance, yet this status would not prevent paternalistic interferences with mature 
minors’ decisions where that child truly requires protection.  
Hence, it has been demonstrated that the common law could ameliorate its own 
misgivings by remedying the archaic paternalism inherent within the retreat cases by 
embracing the rights of competent minors to determine their own medical treatment. 
Nevertheless, these suggestions would all be for naught without assessing the 
likelihood of such techniques being employed by the judiciary. Consequently, this 
chapter moves on to consider its second question: how eager are the courts when it 
comes to increasing minors’ refusal rights? Unfortunately, as with most issues within 
this area of law, the answer is somewhat unclear.  
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The Likelihood of Judicial Change  
 Although the judiciary would be the most obvious choice when it comes to amending 
the law on minors’ refusal rights due to its roots in the common law, it is uncertain 
how likely the courts are to embrace this task. Although some evidence of a judicial 
shift towards autonomy has been seen in the Axon and Mabon cases,26 the courts have 
proven themselves reluctant to embrace minors’ competence and subsequent 
determinative capacity where the consequences are life-threatening.27  
 An NHS Foundation Hospital v P demonstrates this reluctance perfectly.28 Here, the 
High Court was presented with the very scenario academics had been waiting for: a 
mature minor whose competence could not be –and was not– denied who required 
life-saving medical treatment. Many had professed that should such a case arise, due 
to progress regarding children’s rights discussed within Chapter IV, the judiciary 
would find it difficult to ignore autonomy rights for competent, mature minors, leading 
to a challenge to the retreat cases.29 Nevertheless, this did not occur. Instead, the High 
Court upheld Lord Donaldson’s dicta, stating that even once competence is 
unquestionable, a mature minor cannot have a determinative say in whether or not they 
receive life-saving medical treatment. This case confirms suspicions that the judiciary 
are somewhat hypocritical when it comes to children’s rights. When faced with life-
or-death choices, the underlying paternalism inherent within this area of law cannot 
help but rear its head despite progress made within medical law, and the law more 
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generally, in embracing autonomy as its central principle.30 As such, the likelihood of 
judicial alteration to the common law in a way which would increase autonomy rights 
for mature minors appears slim.  
 Not only does NHS v P dampen the glimmer of hope for judicial amendment of the 
common law, the judiciary have been less than willing to fully embrace even adults’ 
rights to autonomy within the context of end of life decisions. As such, this may further 
reduce the chances that the judiciary would welcome an opportunity to amend the law 
to guarantee minors’ rights to refuse life-saving treatment. Evidence of this reluctance 
can be seen within R (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice.31 Here, 
the Supreme Court was faced with claimants seeking to challenge the law on assisted 
suicide. The claimants sought to end their lives due to their respective debilitating 
conditions, but would be or were unable to do so alone. As such, they required 
assistance in order to end their lives.32 Currently an illegal practice, those who would 
assist the claimants would potentially face criminal charges. It was argued that section 
2 of the Suicide Act 1961 breached Article 8 ECHR due to the inability of the mentally 
capable claimants to choose to end their lives simply because this would require 
positive action by another.33 Nevertheless, although a majority of the judges felt this 
case could have resulted in a section 4 declaration of incompatibility under the HRA, 
this step was not taken.34 The judges, with the exception of Lady Hale and Lord Kerr, 
dissenting, 35  chose to defer the issue to Parliament. It was felt that the issue of 
legalising assisted suicide was one of such sensitivity and importance that it would be 
                                                 
30 Alastair Bissett-Johnson and Pamela Ferguson, ‘Consent to Medical Treatment by Older Children 
in English and Scottish Law’ (1995-1996) 12 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 449, 
455-56.  
31 [2014] UKSC 38.   
32 ibid [3]-[10] (Lord Neuberger).  
33 Suicide Act 1961, s2; ibid [5].  
34 Nicklinson (n 31) [113] (Lord Neuberger).  
35 ibid [300] and [326].  
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inappropriate for its determination through the common law. This type of deference is 
relatively common in the context of emotionally-charged, delicate issues which would 
have broad societal consequences.36 As such, it can be predicted that if the judiciary 
are so reluctant to intervene that they refuse even to grant a section 4 declaration, 
which holds no binding weight, that they would be equally unwilling to allow minors 
the ability to refuse treatment which would result in their deaths. The Nicklinson 
litigation is just one example of judicial deference and reluctance to embrace change 
when it comes to life-and-death decisions.37 As such, the potential for change through 
the judiciary looks less and less likely.   
 Nevertheless, hope is not lost. As mentioned within Chapter IV, the Nicklinson judges 
were particularly reluctant to force Parliament’s hand on the issue due to concurrent 
discussion of a Bill which sought to amend the relevant Act’s ban on assisted suicide.38 
No such interference with Parliamentary intent would be required regarding the reform 
of the retreat cases and law on minors’ rights to refuse. The law in this area is founded 
largely in the common law, or the retreat cases at least are of judicial origin. As such, 
the override of these cases within the judiciary would be an entirely suitable reform 
method, avoiding the controversies which led to such a timid judicial approach within 
Nicklinson. Additionally, as mentioned within the previous chapter, some of the dicta 
within Nicklinson can provide evidence of the Supreme Court’s commitment to 
upholding autonomy as a central principle for medical law. Nevertheless, until a 
refusal case comes before the higher courts, the true motivations of the courts in their 
reluctance to embrace minors’ autonomy can only be speculated. As mentioned 
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previously, the recent NHS v P case was heard only by the High Court. It may be that 
the lack of progress for minors is due to reluctance to interfere with precedent. In this 
case, hope is not lost for minors’ rights to refuse should the Court of Appeal or 
Supreme Court hear a suitable case.  
 Although some hope may remain for minors’ refusal rights in terms of the override 
of the retreat cases, arguably the courts would be reluctant to eradicate all powers to 
protect even competent minors.39 A more restricted, autonomy-focused residual power 
to replace the retreat cases’ paternalism could exist within the inherent jurisdiction, as 
previously discussed. Nevertheless, in terms of the likelihood of the inherent 
jurisdiction being employed as a tool for promoting autonomy, as has been seen for 
adult patients, this is also sadly uncertain.  
 As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, the judiciary are less than 
enthusiastic about granting competent minors capacity which would be equivalent to 
that of competent adults. Therefore, it is perhaps unlikely that the inherent jurisdiction 
would be applied quite so positively for minors should the retreat cases be overruled. 
The courts have proven that when left to their own devices they are willing to prioritise 
paternalism over autonomy where minors are involved, especially in life-and-death 
scenarios.40 The same would be possible with the inherent jurisdiction. Rather than 
using this power to maximise competence and promote autonomy, the judiciary may 
repeat their mistakes regarding manipulation of their powers in the same way as within 
the refusal cases. As seen within Chapter III, the courts are keen to grasp at the chance 
to overrule intelligent and potentially competent minors. As such, the inherent 
jurisdiction, whilst having the potential to offer a solution which not only empowers 
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but protects children, could be used in a negatively paternalistic manner. 41  The 
inherent jurisdiction could go the same way as the Gillick test, with the courts 
exploiting its flexibility to intervene with capable minors who do not require 
protection, but who rather make a decision which sits uncomfortably with paternalistic 
ideals. As such, it is suggested that a judicial solution to the confusion within the law 
could only plausibly work if the courts were truly willing to promote competence and 
capacity for competent minors.  
Legislative Change 
 As an alternative to the common law, reform for minors’ rights to refuse treatment 
could instead mirror the adult position. In other words, a legislative scheme could be 
devised to replace, or codify, the current legal test for minors and set out in clear 
statutory form their rights once such competence is achieved.  This could come from 
extending the existing adult scheme, the MCA, to under 16s.42 The possibility of 
legislative change which would embrace the rights of capable, mature minors shall 
now be explored and assessed as to its suitability and likelihood.  
Extension of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 The MCA currently provides the test for competence regarding those over the age of 
16. It is comprised of a two-part test, along with general principles in section 1. The 
most notable aspects of the MCA shall be outlined in terms of how they would alter 
the legal position of minors in order to modernise the current law and prioritise 
autonomy. 
                                                 
41 Robin Mackenzie and John Watts, 'Is childhood a disability? Using Mental Capacity Tribunals and 
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 First is the presumption of capacity.43 Unless evidence is available and apparent to 
rebut this, adults, and those between the ages of 16 and 17 due to the impact of the 
FLRA, are presumed to have the competence and hence the capacity to make their 
own medical decisions. This contrasts the current situation for minors, who must prove 
they have Gillick competence before even being considered to have the capacity to 
consent or refuse for themselves.44 Some feel that allowing this presumption to apply 
to minors would help to counteract the inherent stigma many have against minors’ 
abilities to obtain and exercise their competence.45 Rather than the child bearing the 
considerable onus of convincing a reluctant judiciary that they deserve to be granted 
capacity, the burden would fall upon the medical professional or judge to show 
evidence of that child’s incompetence.  This would, in theory, ensure that a child’s 
decision making capacity could only be overridden if there were real and serious 
concerns about their abilities to make the decision required. This could help to 
counteract the dubious judicial reasoning seen within Chapter III currently employed 
within refusal cases. Premonitions about minors being ‘overwhelmed’ by 46  or 
underappreciative of the consequences of47 their decision would have to be backed up 
with facts in order to rebut a presumption of capacity, which could ensure a greater 
respect and priority for minors’ autonomy rights.   
 Nevertheless, this thesis shall suggest that applying the presumption of capacity to 
under 16s may do more harm than good. As shall be explained below, the MCA test 
sets a much lower standard than is seen within Gillick. As such, the presumption of 
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46 Re M (Medical Treatment: Consent) [1999] 2 FLR 1097.  
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capacity would allow cases of borderline competence to fall in favour giving that child 
decision making capacity. This may mean that children who are in need of protection, 
in other words those who lack competence and do not have true autonomous 
capabilities, are given control over serious medical decisions. Additionally, children 
are usually more likely to be subject to familial influence, as they are more likely to 
be living with and dependent on their parents or guardians, as opposed to adults who 
tend to live separately.48 As such, this higher potential for influence may increase the 
chances that a child is not acting autonomously. Consequently, a child’s autonomous 
decision-making capabilities should be assessed, rather than assumed. As Herring has 
stated, to deny capacity to someone who has competence is abhorrent, but it is perhaps 
even more abhorrent to force capacity upon an incompetent individual who cannot 
make that decision with full autonomy.49 As such, although the benefits of the MCA’s 
presumption may be apparent in theory, the reality is that some protection for minors 
must be preserved to ensure that capacity is granted only to truly competent patients.  
 Another distinction with the current common law governing minors is that the MCA 
requires that ‘all practicable steps’ must be taken to ensure that an individual could 
attempt to make their decision for themselves if capable of doing so.50 This would 
mean that a person who is on the borderline of competence but is refusing treatment 
due to a fear of needles, or perhaps religious pressure from family, would have to be 
spoken to and assessed as to their competence without the stressor present. This would 
mean, for example, removing needles from sight, or speaking to the patient without 
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the family’s intervention.51 This principle also requires communication of the relevant 
information needed in order to exercise competence to the patient if they could be 
capable of understanding. This duty does not formally exist for minors, which is a 
great hindrance for those attempting to assert their right to refuse treatment. 52 
Although, as Cave states, there may be some evidence of a duty to attempt to 
‘maximise’ minors’ competencies,53 to extend the MCA to under 16s would ensure 
that they do not miss out on the opportunity to exercise autonomy.  
 If extended to minors under the age of 16, doctors, other medical professionals and 
judges would have a formal, legal duty to ensure that a mature, intelligent minor has 
all the tools they require in order to exercise their competence. As such, the 
problematic reasoning explored in Chapter III within cases such as Re E and Re L,54 
would not occur. Here, it shall be recalled that the minors were stated to lack 
competence due to their lack of understanding of the nature of their deaths, something 
which they were never told. Under the MCA, section 1(3) would require that 
information to be provided, in order to ensure that if the patients are capable of making 
the decision for themselves, such ability would be prioritised over paternalistic 
intervention. Once more, it can be seen that the extension of the MCA could provide 
a solution to some of the more dubious judicial tactics which have been employed to 
stunt progress for minors’ refusal rights.  
 Another change would, of course, be to the relevant test to assess competence. The 
MCA requires a two-part test to be applied for adults who are suspected of lacking 
                                                 
51 Examples drawn from: Re MB (n 15); Re T (n 12).  
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competence. The first is that the inability to decide must be caused by ‘an impairment 
of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.’ 55  Secondly, this 
impairment must render the patient unable to retain, understand and use the 
information relevant to their decision.56  Whilst the latter requirement is arguably 
similar to the Gillick test, with both requiring an understanding of the procedure, 
section 2 lowers the bar from the current common law. Requiring an ‘impairment’ or 
‘disturbance’ of the mind or brain would make it much harder for judges to find 
incompetence utilising this test in minors’ refusal cases. Although such disturbances 
can be temporary and need not relate to a permanent condition,57 immaturity would 
likely not be enough to satisfy this test. As such, minors would have a much easier 
time proving competence than under the strict Gillick standard.  
 Nevertheless, there is fear amongst the academic community that extending the MCA 
test to minors would set the bar for competence far too low.58 Under the MCA, some 
feel that most, or at least many more, minors would be seen to be competent where 
they would fail the Gillick test.59 This is because the test does not consider ‘richer 
notion[s] of autonomy’, meaning factors which could affect competence which go 
beyond mental impairment.60 This may include familial influence, the sincerity of the 
beliefs which motivate the decision and so on. Still, this need not mark the MCA as 
entirely ill-suited as a reform option for minors. Although the MCA takes a fairly 
narrow view of competence, and does not consider factors beyond an ‘impairment’ of 
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the mind which may in fact impair a minor’s decision-making abilities,61 as has been 
stated, the inherent jurisdiction could fill these ‘gaps’ in protection. After all, although 
by no means a perfect test, extending the MCA to patients of all ages would ensure 
that we have clarity for minors, one standard for all without compromising on 
protecting those who truly need it. 62  Nevertheless, once the likelihood of 
parliamentary change has been assessed, the suitability of this reform option shall be 
questioned.  
The Likelihood of Parliamentary Change 
 A clear, statutory scheme would allow for a more straightforward picture when it 
comes to minors’ rights to refuse treatment. There would also be no need to wait for a 
suitable case to arise in order to change the law, in contrast to common law reform. 
Nevertheless, whilst legislative change may provide greater potential for certainty 
within this area of law, once more the likelihood of such reform must be assessed. 
Legislative change must, of course, have the support of Parliament. Judging from the 
treatment, or perhaps avoidance, of similar issues political will to change the law in 
this area is lacking. 
 To return to the example of assisted suicide, Parliamentary consideration of this 
controversial issue for competent individuals may shed light on the likelihood of 
success for minors’ refusal rights. The judges in Nicklinson refused to pressure 
Parliament to reconsider the law on assisted suicide due to its concurrent consideration 
of a Bill which would allow ‘competent adults who are terminally ill to be provided at 
their request with specified assistance to end their own life’.63 Despite autonomy being 
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heralded as the central principle of medical law when it comes to competent adults, 
Parliament has shown no further interest in  amending or repealing the Suicide Act’s 
penalties regarding assisted suicide. 64  If the legislature are unwilling to embrace 
autonomy for capable adults where life-threatening issues arise,65  it is likely that 
capable minors have an even bleaker chance when it comes to meaningful reform for 
their rights to refuse such treatment.  
 Minors generally have a more protectionist stance lingering over their legal rights, 
due to the involvement and relevance of issues such as parental rights. According to 
Montgomery and Alderson, this legislative protectionism can be evidenced within the 
lack of decisive weight given to children’s views within the Children Act 1989. They 
feel that this shows the lack of political will to grant minors true, meaningful power 
over their own decisions.66 Additionally, society at large still attaches a great deal of 
vulnerability to childhood,67 which would once more limit the possibility of legislative 
change. Political pressures mean that public support of minors’ rights to refuse 
treatment may be intrinsically linked to the likelihood of politicians backing such 
reforms. As such, until more progress is seen for the end of life autonomy of adults, 
or public support for minors’ rights improves, it is unlikely similar autonomy will be 
granted to minors seeking to refuse life-saving treatment.  
 Even if the legislative branches were more willing to engage with minors’ autonomy 
rights, it is uncertain that extending the MCA would make much difference for 
refusing minors. If the presumption of capacity was extended to minors, as discussed 
above, it could mean a greater respect for minors as capable and intelligent individuals. 
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Nevertheless, as discussed within Chapter III, the judiciary have managed to find ways 
to ‘disprove’ competence even where they have the overt power to overrule competent 
minors. There is no evidence to show that the same tactics would not be employed 
against minors should the MCA be extended to children in order to rebut the 
presumption of capacity and allow paternalistic intervention. As such, legislative 
change is very much intertwined with judicial willingness to embrace the independent 
rights of minors. If judges wish to find ways to allow their intervention, they have 
proven on many occasions that they have a plethora of tactics and reasoning in order 
to do so. Once more, it seems that a shift in attitude towards childhood and minors 
may be the underlying issue which has prevented reform within this area. 
Consequently, it would once more appear that although the legislative tools to embrace 
minors’ rights to refuse are within reach for Parliament, the likelihood of such steps 
being taken is less than promising.  
 Due to the potential lack of protection for borderline incompetent minors discussed 
above, it is argued that the extension of the MCA in its entirety to those under the age 
of 16 would not be the best option for reform. The presumption of capacity has been 
shown to be a potential pitfall if applied to minors. Additionally, the test for 
competence would arguably be too easily satisfied even if the presumption was limited 
to over 16s. Even if the MCA was applied to under 16s, the opposite issue could also 
arise. The judiciary could manipulate case facts to overcome the lower standards and 
presumptions enshrined within the MCA. Due to their pivotal role in the potential for 
applying and prioritising minors’ rights, this thesis suggests that despite a poor track 
record within refusal cases, the judiciary are best suited to lead the way for reform in 
this area. The hope is that they can embrace this challenge with a focus on human 
rights, rather than excessive paternalism.  
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Social Change- A Preliminary Necessity? 
 A recurring theme throughout this chapter when considering avenues for reform is 
the absence of will to grant competent minors the right to make their own decisions 
without interference. Although the tools required to allow competent minors the same 
rights as adults already exist, nothing has been done to change the law in this area for 
over two decades. As such, it is suggested that in order for capable minors’ rights to 
refuse to be respected and hold real weight, what is needed first is for society to 
embrace minors’ abilities as equal to that of adults.  
 Currently, the courts and parents retain a significant amount of control of a minors’ 
health care decisions until they reach 18. Overruling the retreat cases would require 
adults to allow mature minors independence which goes beyond the boundaries of 
their supervision and control– a limit on their powers. Judging from the lack of 
progress in this area, adults are at present ‘unwilling’ to relinquish their control and 
protection over minors. 68  In this sense, the duty adults currently feel towards 
protecting children, regardless of the child’s competence, from what is perceived to 
be harmful must be challenged. Not all mature minors are in need of protection. If a 
minor is capable of understanding and accepting the consequences of their refusal, is 
able to satisfy the relevant legal test and is unaffected by significant alternate 
influences, adults should not be permitted to intervene. Yet, they continue to do so, or 
at least leave the door open which allows them to do so.69 
 They do so because they disagree with the minors’ decisions. For adult patients, 
agreement with the patient’s choice is irrelevant, what is important is their 
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competence. Nevertheless, we still appear to assess the rationality of a minor’s 
decision to refuse against our own perception of the ‘correct’ decision. This 
asymmetry is evidenced within Lord Donaldson’s dicta in Re R.70 Here, he states that 
allowing a competent minor to refuse without interference would present an 
‘intolerable dilemma’ for doctors.71 In this, he meant the ‘dilemma’ of potentially 
facing charges if they were to treat despite the refusal. This highlights the inherent 
difference in approaches to adults and children. Despite the same risks of prosecution 
with adult patients at the time,72 no such ‘dilemma’ was seen by Lord Donaldson 
where a competent adult refuses treatment despite the same risks of prosecution.73 If 
an adult refuses treatment, the doctor must obey despite any urges to protect the patient 
from harm and/or death, and do so without question unless aggravating factors call the 
decision’s validity into question. Nevertheless, this logic is not applied to minors, as 
society views them as inherently requiring such protection despite their levels of 
maturity or intelligence. This can be traced to the stereotyping of children as illogical 
beings, and adults as older and therefore wiser.74 Society assumes that children who 
refuse life-saving treatment are wrong and that the judges, doctors, or parents are 
correct; the latter are seen to be more logical and capable due to their advantage in 
terms of age. These generalisations must be challenged in order for any real progress 
to be made in the field of children’s rights and medical consent law.  
 Although some progress for minors’ rights can be seen within the Axon and Mabon 
cases, discussed within the previous chapter, there is still a long road ahead. As seen 
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even amongst academics who otherwise support autonomy, there is still a reluctance 
to embrace minors’ rights if they make a choice which sits uncomfortably with their 
paternalistic urges.75 As a society, we still separate childhood and adulthood in terms 
of ability. Childhood is generally perceived as a time of inherent vulnerability and 
dependence on adults, of illogical thinking and immaturity.76 Although true for some, 
especially very young children, to apply this dichotomy without nuance to mature 
minors is somewhat unrealistic.  
 Not all children are unwise, especially those who have the misfortune of suffering 
chronic or long-term medical conditions.77 Such children, Lynn Hagger advocates, 
would know far more than most adults about their condition, and would possess the 
ability to understand and consider the positives and negatives of relevant proposed 
treatment.78 Equally, many adults cannot be said to be wise, independent nor capable. 
Consequently, the status and attached stereotypes of ‘childhood’, as Herring, Probert 
and Gilmore profess, are no more than ‘socially constructed’ generalisations.79 The 
idea of maturity and ‘adulthood’ being bestowed upon an individual when they turn 
18 is entirely unrealistic.80 Nevertheless, the incessant, instinctual call of paternalism 
is proving hard to resist despite evidence that children are intellectually capable of far 
more than society appears willing to give them credit for.81  
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 Social prejudices against those legally considered to be children act as a barrier to the 
sort of progress sought for minors within this thesis.82 As such, it is suggested that we 
need to tear down these barriers before the reform suggestions above have any chance 
of radically improving minors’ legal rights. Even if serious changes were made 
imminently, arguably their practical impact could be dampened without a gradual 
embrace of minors’ abilities and autonomy. As stated by Brems, even if changes are 
made within the formal legal system, children will find it hard to exercise their rights 
if social customs and stereotypes still oppose or contradict such rights.83 Competence 
is much less likely to be found and accepted if social paradigms still preconceive 
minors as incapable of true independence until they reach the age of majority. 
Therefore, this chapter shall conclude by suggesting ways in which this social change 
could be brought about.  
How to Prompt Social Change  
 Although the need for change in social attitudes has been argued within this section, 
it is important to note that progress has been, and is still being, made.84 As seen within 
the previous chapter, progress for children’s rights has come a long way since the 
introduction of the UNCRC. Additionally, social change can arguably be seen within 
out-of-court refusal cases. Children have been allowed to refuse life-saving treatment 
outside of the judicial setting. Two such cases involved minors named Hannah Jones 
and Joshua McAuley. Jones was 13, and sought to refuse a heart transplant after 
treatment for leukaemia.85 Similarly to M’s case, she did not wish to live with a life of 
drugs and preferred to die by her own choice.86 McAuley, aged 15, refused blood 
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transfusion after suffering injuries during a car crash. In connection with the Re E and 
L cases, he refused treatment due to his Jehovah’s Witness faith.87 However, neither 
of these minors had to go to court to assert their refusal rights.  
 The doctors in each case, although at first reluctant, appreciated that the decisions 
were made with competence and full appreciation of the consequences. Both refusals 
were accepted without the need for judicial interference. When compared to similar 
court cases, it can be inferred that the judiciary would not have been as willing to 
accept the minors’ refusals. Whilst Jones later accepted a transplant and survived, 
McAuley’s decision to remain committed to his faith was accepted and lead to his 
death. Although Joshua’s is a sad tale, his and Hannah’s choices evidence some degree 
of ground-level acceptance of the potential for minors to demonstrate competence to 
make their own decisions, no matter the consequences.88 The underlying message is 
that although we may disagree with the decisions of capable minors, the choice is 
ultimately theirs to make. 89  Paternalistic impulses were quelled, and autonomy 
prioritised in these cases, providing some hope for the future of children’s rights in 
this area.  
 It is important to remember that the number of cases which reach the courts is small. 
The majority of minors refusing treatment will have their discrepancy resolved outside 
of the court setting. The people making decisions about whether to grant capacity and 
accept refusals on a daily basis will be medical professionals, not Parliament or the 
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judiciary. This is why this thesis aims to show that social acceptance of minors’ 
autonomy is likely to have a much bigger impact than legal change alone. 
Nevertheless, although ground-level decisions will have the most impact, this does not 
mean that the judiciary has no role to play in the social change which is recommended 
within this thesis. In fact, they may be the best route for the facilitation of further 
progress for the amelioration of minors’ rights and independence.  
 The judiciary have the advantage of incremental reform. A fully-fledged, swift 
overhaul of adults’ control leaving minors with complete autonomy, although 
favourable objectively, may not work without pre-existing social acceptance of such 
abilities and rights for children. As such, the judiciary could bring in piecemeal 
reforms which would more delicately introduce greater rights for minors, whilst 
chipping away at overly paternalistic measures over time. Evidence of the judiciary’s 
ability to impact and reflect social attitudes are seen within Axon and Mabon.90 The 
law has slowly shifted its focus away from medical paternalism towards the autonomy 
and empowerment of competent patients. Even now, medical law has changed its 
prominent principle from that of ‘doctor knows best’ to absolute priority for patient 
autonomy, expected not only within the law but within society.91 Nevertheless, minors 
are still somewhat excluded from this progress. It is suggested that although social 
change may take time, the judiciary can assist by not only reinforcing the existing 
progress discussed above, but in increasing the momentum for reform. This chapter 
                                                 
90 Ananda Hall, ‘Children’s Rights, Parents’ Wishes and the State: The Medical Treatment of 
Children’ [2006] Family Law 317, 322.  
91 JJ Chin, ‘Doctor-patient Relationship: from Medical Paternalism to Enhanced Autonomy’ (2002) 
43(3) Singapore Medical Journal 152, 152; Janet E Smith, ‘The Pre-eminence of Autonomy in 
Bioethics’ in David S Oderberg and Jacqueline A Laing (eds), Human Lives: Critical Essays on 
Consequentialist Bioethics (Palgrave 1997) 183.  
99 
 
shall move on to suggest just how the courts could help assist progress for minors’ 
autonomy rights.  
 Firstly, rather than extending the MCA to minors, the judiciary could take inspiration 
from this Act in order to promote autonomy. If a child can be seen to have competence, 
a duty equivalent to that seen within section 1(3) of the MCA would greatly empower 
competent children. This would prevent the denial of competence based on missing 
information, and would also ensure that those with competence can more easily assert 
that ability in relation to medical decisions. This could be a positive, incremental step 
in embracing the minors’ understanding of information relevant to medical 
procedures, which would in turn challenge social stigma against minors having such 
intelligence and abilities.  
 The law could also be developed in relation to parental rights over their competent, 
mature children. The law has already adjusted the language of parental rights to one 
of ‘parental responsibility’.92 This was intended, or so perceived by Andrew Bainham 
in 1988, to make society rethink the ‘parental role’ from one of absolute control to one 
of responsibility for the child’s benefit.93 However, the courts could go even further 
by emphasising that parents should be seen to have duties towards their children within 
the medical context, rather than powers.94 A positive first step in this sense could be 
to follow the lead of New South Wales. Although utilising the same Gillick test, in a 
Commission report New South Wales has professed an intention to remove the rights 
of parents to veto a child’s competently made decision even if that decision involves 
                                                 
92 Children Act 1989, s2 and s3.  
93 Andrew Bainham, Children, Parents and the Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1988) 60-1.  
94 Ian Kennedy, ‘Despite Charlie Gard’s tragic story, we must respect the process of our courts’ The 
Guardian (London, 24 July 2017) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/24/charlie-gard-
tragic-respect-courts> accessed 31 July 2017.  
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the refusal of consent.95 As such, this could be a positive first step in order to reflect 
and encourage changing attitudes towards children’s rights and ameliorate broader 
social progress. Although removing parental powers of override within this context 
may still be met with resistance, this should not stop the judiciary from paying real 
regard to human rights as they are bound to do. As Van Bove has stated, ‘the 
empowerment of the vulnerable […] often meets the resistance of the defenders of the 
status quo’.96  
 The courts would in this instance retain some degree of control of competent minors 
within their own powers, but make a positive and long overdue step towards the 
effectual override of the Re W principles. In fact, Cave has stated that the reasoning 
within cases such as Axon ‘might in future lead the courts in England and Wales to a 
similar conclusion’ as seen within New South Wales.97 Such reform on behalf of the 
judiciary would ensure that parental duties remain just that, duties, rather than overtly 
controlling powers which inhibit a competent child’s autonomy. This would ensure a 
retreat to the intention of Gillick as is interpreted by this thesis, or at least the 
interpretation of Gillick which would come when human rights obligations are 
considered– that the achievement of Gillick competence should prevent parental 
override of the child’s decision.  
 This thesis would prefer that the courts removed all interference with the competently 
made decisions of a child outright, no matter the consequences. The only power of 
                                                 
95 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Young People and Consent to Heathcare (Report 119, 
October 2008) [5.44] <www.lawreform.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/report_119.pdf> accessed 17 
July 2017. 
96 Theo Van Bove, ‘Children’s Rights are Human Rights’ in Jan CM Willems (ed), Developmental 
and Autonomy Rights of Children: Empowering Children, Caregivers and Communities (Second 
Edition, Intersentia 2007) 3.  
97 Emma Cave, ‘Adolescent consent and confidentiality in the UK’ (2009) 16(4) European Journal of 
Health Law 309, 319.  
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paternalistic intervention which should remain is the inherent jurisdiction, required 
only to protect those without true autonomy. Paternalistic interference with competent 
decisions should not extend beyond this limited context. This should be the judiciary’s 
end goal. Nevertheless, it is somewhat unrealistic to expect the courts to give up not 
only parental control of competent minors, but to limit their own powers in one all-
encompassing reform. As such, this thesis has attempted to suggest some more limited 
reform options with could encompass the first steps taken towards the complete 
empowerment of competent and mature minors. The courts cannot continue to ignore 
their duties regarding children’s rights. They have duties both domestically and 
internationally to ensure that the United Kingdom complies with its human rights 
obligations. To continue to avoid reformation of this area of law is to ameliorate 
decades of injustice for mature minors. Clarity is long overdue, and the judiciary may 
be the only ones able to not only reflect society’s changing attitudes, but to lead the 
way to further meaningful change. It will be a long road towards complete 
empowerment and autonomy for competent minors, but the judiciary ought to ensure 
that we are at least on the right path.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion  
 
This thesis has aimed to prove that the law on minors’ refusals of life-saving medical 
treatment is at present in an entirely unsatisfactory state. Children cannot be sure of 
their rights, as it is unclear whether there is a scenario where they could ever be granted 
capacity, regardless of their intellectual maturity or their competence. It has been 
argued that to eradicate the ability for mature minors to refuse to consent to treatment 
would leave only an empty right to consent. To have but one choice, the alternative 
being that another will consent on their behalf, is unacceptable. Indeed, to call such a 
decision a choice would be a farce. Heywood agrees with such a conclusion, stating 
that to prevent all refusals by minors merely due to their age would not embrace the 
‘active role’ the law ought to take in the protection of individual rights.1 Quite the 
opposite, it would diminish and undermine children’s rights. As such, it has been 
demonstrated that the law is in need of clarification. However, that clarification should 
not come in the form of further limiting minors’ rights to refuse.  
 The first step which has been suggested by the previous chapter would be to eradicate 
the ability for parental intervention with their child’s competently made decision. It 
was demonstrated within Chapter II that the Gillick case was most likely intended as 
a qualification on parental rights. 2  This was evidenced within Lord Scarman’s 
judgment as well as the statements made by Lord Fraser. Despite some potential 
opposition from academics such as Stephen Gilmore regarding the liberal agenda of 
                                                 
1 Rob Heywood, ‘The Right of Terminally Ill Teenagers to make End-of-Life Decisions’ (2009) 77(1) 
Medico-Legal Journal 30, 31.  
2 Andrew Bainham, Children, Parents and the Law (Sweet and Maxwell 1988) 49.  
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the Gillick judgments,3 it is argued that even if the case was not as liberally inclined 
as it has subsequently been interpreted to be upon its conclusion in 1985, this would 
not prevent a more modern interpretation being taken currently.  As was shown within 
Chapter IV, much has changed regarding the UK’s legal landscape since the early 
1990s, and even more so since Gillick. Human rights, and children’s rights, have 
become much more prevalent regarding the law’s focus. As such, many legal issues 
decided before these changes occurred will be in need of reconsideration and a modern 
update. As stated within the Gillick judgment itself, the law ignores progress and 
change ‘at its peril’.4 The current judiciary would be equally foolish to ignore the 
increased prominence of autonomy rights and human rights highlighted within 
Chapter IV. In light of the inclusion of autonomy rights within Article 8 ECHR,5 as 
well as increased emphasis given to children’s evolving capabilities within recent 
judicial dicta in Axon and Mabon,6 it is concluded that to allow parental override of 
the child’s competent decision would be unjustifiable and incompatible with human 
rights obligations. Consequently, the suggestion that the qualification of parental 
rights should be one of the first steps towards embracing autonomy for minors is seen 
to be a very suitable option for reform.  
 Nevertheless, the failings of the law in empowering competent minors is certainly not 
limited to the scope of parental responsibility. The courts have also held on to their 
vast powers to override competent children despite the human rights obligations they 
are tasked with upholding. This thesis has sought to remind the judiciary that they are 
                                                 
3 Stephen Gilmore, ‘The Limits of Parental Responsibility’ in Rebecca Probert, Stephen Gilmore and 
Jonathan Herring (eds), Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility (Hart Publishing 2009) 64 
and 75.  
4 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112, 183 (Lord Scarman).  
5 Pretty v United Kingdom, App No (2346/02) (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [61].  
6 R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health [2006] EWHC 37 (Admin), [130] (Silber J); Mabon v 
Mabon [2005] EWCA Civ 634, [28] (Thorpe LJ).  
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for many a facilitator of rights, tasked not only with protecting the vulnerable but 
empowering the capable as well. The case law at present shows an unwavering 
concentration on the former protective role, and a neglect for the empowerment of 
mature and competent minors. At times, this concentration on paternalism over 
autonomy has led to dubious and manipulative use or, even more strikingly, ignorance 
of the relevant law as was evidenced within Chapter III. In fact, this manipulation of 
the law has been shown to have the potential to do more harm than good. Not only do 
the judicial tactics explored by this thesis cause unbridled confusion in the 
requirements for competence and the possibility for minors’ capacity, but they demean 
intelligent, mature individuals by tenuously labelling them as incompetent or mentally 
impaired.7  
 It has been argued that due to the high standards set by the law, the current protective 
stance is unnecessary for autonomous, competent children who wish to refuse 
treatment based on their sincere beliefs and wishes. To interfere with the decisions of 
minors who are competent and autonomous takes the courts into the realms of 
excessive paternalism. Rather than focusing on the outcome if intervention was to be 
withheld, the law should instead shift its focus to ‘competent, autonomous choice’ 
rather than ‘presumptuous ideals’.8 The fact that the judge or parent feels that the child 
is making the ‘wrong’ decision should not be enough to justify the override of that 
child’s autonomous choice. To impose another’s concept of the ‘correct’ choice on a 
competent individual would ignore their individual wishes and beliefs, which is 
something that ought to be respected with the achievement of competence.  
                                                 
7 Charlotte McCafferty, ‘Won’t Consent? Can’t Consent! Refusal of Medical Treatment’ (1999) 
Family Law 335, 336.  
8 Heywood (n 1) 33.  
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 The judiciary have inherently good intentions behind their manipulation of the law, 
wishing to preserve the life of the minor involved. Nevertheless, this area of law is a 
prime example of ‘do-gooders’ doing ‘unwanted good’.9 The child’s decision may 
come from vehemently held religious beliefs, which the judiciary cannot understand 
as outweighing the value of life.10 Nevertheless, if competent to do so, the child should 
be able to base their refusal on whatever genuinely held beliefs they possess. To 
overrule their beliefs, particularly religious beliefs, can be incredibly distressing and 
emotionally scarring for the child, and as such unwarranted interference with a 
competent decision can do more harm than the perceived good.11 As McLean has 
stated, if competently made, the choice, although ‘uncomfortable’ to think that a child 
could die, is that child’s decision and theirs alone.12  
 The retreat cases have been almost exclusively avoided in their most controversial 
sense, that is, in their authorisation of the override of a competent minor’s choice to 
refuse life-saving treatment. Chapter III demonstrated the lengths the judiciary have 
gone to in order to avoid such application of the Re W judgment. Consequently, it has 
been argued that the retreat cases ought to be overruled or reinterpreted under the HRA 
imminently. Chapter II evidenced the questionable nature of Lord Donaldson’s 
reasoning to begin with, and Chapter III demonstrated that even the judiciary are wary 
to apply these controversial judgments when incompetence can be argued, however 
tenuously, as an alternative. Chapter IV additionally questioned the continued 
application of the retreat cases, as they are most likely incompatible with the UK’s 
                                                 
9 Julian Savulescu, ‘The Trouble with Do-Gooders: the Example of Suicide’ (1997) 23 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 108, 108.  
10 As was the case in Re E (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1993] 1 FLR 386.  
11 Michael Freeman, ‘Rethinking Gillick’ (2005) 13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 201, 
209. 
12 Sheila AM McLean, ‘Whose Decision is it Anyway?’ The BMJ.com (14 November 2008)   
<http://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2008/11/14/sheila-mclean-whose-decision-is-it-anyway/> accessed 21 
June 2017.  
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human rights obligations. As such, this thesis finds it difficult to come to any other 
conclusion than to dispel of these troublesome and excessively paternalistic 
authorities.  
 Additionally, this thesis has aimed to show that to overrule the retreat cases would 
not leave mature minors without protection. The potential for refinement of the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction in a similar way which has been seen for vulnerable adults may 
provide the safety net of protection needed to prompt the judiciary to abandon the 
retreat cases. Even if competent, the inherent jurisdiction would ensure that only those 
capable of truly autonomous choice are granted capacity. As such, the worries which 
seem to fuel the judiciary’s attempts to manipulate Gillick and secure the minor’s 
incompetence have been unnecessary. Instead, the judiciary could embrace the child’s 
competence, and instead look towards the child’s autonomous capabilities to assess 
whether it is justified to intervene with the decision. Only if the child cannot exercise 
their competence in an autonomous manner should intervention be permitted. 
Competent decisions should not be capable of being overridden as a default option. 
Rather, this should be the exception to the rule. Competence regarding a decision to 
refuse treatment should, generally, lead to capacity for mature minors.  
 Nevertheless, it has been established that the largest hurdle to overcome in order for 
meaningful reform to occur for mature minors is the social stigma which currently 
applies to those below the age of majority. As addressed within Chapter V, the idea 
that minors should be able to exercise the same rights as adults if competent has been 
difficult to accept. This stigma against minors being capable of competent choice 
without adult interference has led to legal confusion surrounding minors’ refusal 
rights. As stated above, the judiciary must remember that their role is not purely 
protectionist, but encompasses the empowerment of those who deserve autonomy. As 
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such, it has been suggested that the judiciary may be the most suited to the task of 
addressing and reforming social attitudes towards childhood, breaking down barriers 
for mature minors and facilitating their rights. This would, eventually, ideally result in 
the abandonment of the retreat cases.  
 This thesis has aimed to prove that a child’s minority should never be enough to 
justify the override of a competently made decision.13 Competence, if teamed with an 
ability to act autonomously, should lead to the acceptance of capacity for the 
individual, regardless of age. The dichotomy between childhood and adulthood 
regarding autonomous and cognitive abilities is largely ill-founded and must be 
challenged in the context of medical treatment. The current approach of the judiciary 
in their falsification of, and even disregard for, the Gillick test cannot continue. The 
overrule of the retreat cases is long overdue, and it is time that autonomy was solidly 
established as the central concept for medical consent law, regardless of age.  
                                                 
13 Caroline Bridge, ‘Religious Beliefs and Teenage Refusal of Medical Treatment’ (1999) 62 Modern 
Law Review 585, 589. 
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